¶ THE Philosopher *of the Court, written* by Philbert of *Vienne in Champaigne,* And Englished by George North, Gentlemã.

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ANNO. 1575.

To the right vvor-
ſhipfull Maſter Chriſtopher Hatton Eſquier, Cap-

taine of the Queenes Maieſties *Garde, and Gentleman of hir* highneſſe priuie Chamber.

THAT noble Stoicke Seneca (right vvorſhipfull) to vvhome all the ancients paſt yelded place & principalitie for Morall Philoſophie, ſhut vp in this ſhorte ſentence reaſons of great ſubſtance, ſaying: Fortune is euer fleeting, for ſhe neuer giueth ioy vvithout heauineſſe, ſvveete vvithout bitterneſſe, reſt vvithout trauell, renoume vvithout enuie, and generally, no felicitie vvithout ſome ſequele of aduerſitie. This I preſently find verefied in myſelf, vvhile motioned by glad minde and duetifull good vvill to ſhroude this little labor vnder the protection of your

vvorſhips fauoure, I feele double feare to front my proceeding: youre noble vvorthyneſſe and my baſhfull rudeneſſe, vvhich both are repugnant to my humble deſire: yet matching the firſte vvyth the goodneſſe of youre nature (compelled to encounter force vvith force) and mating the laſt vvith the profoundneſſe of my Author, I preſume to preſent the ſame vnto you, entituled the *Philoſopher of the Court*, and dedicated to his Ladie a louer of vertue. The name and dedicatiō ſeemeth of ſome credite, but the circūſtance and concluſion I can not ſufficiently commende. Great volumes haue large fieldes to marche in, and ſo muche the more laborſome to peruſe: but if it pleaſe youre vvorſhip to tread ouer this little Treatiſe, I dare aduouch, you ſhall finde in it, both floures and fruite (not to ſupply the ſcarcetie, but to encreaſe the plentie and pleaſaunte purpoſes) of Courtly Philoſophie. VVherein as my ignorance ſhall eclipſe or ſhadovve the vvorthyneſſe of the vvorke: Spread (I humble

hnmbly praye) the gladſome beames of your fauourable and vvell liking cheere vpon it: ſo ſhall you render to the reader my Author much betterd, make him of other gentlemen Courtiers more accepted, my pen to further trauell encouraged, and my ſelfe in this enterpriſe moſt glad and pleaſed. Heere ſome curious man may controll me for preſuming to tranſlate, profeſsing (as neceſſitie compelleth) a harder condition, and ſaye : a vvriter of a Souldier ? vvhy ? the pen and pyke doe differ, Mars and Minerua are contrarie, Bellona is nothing pleaſed vvith bokes : yet Poets haue oft painted Pallas that Academicall Goddes to be armed vvith ſpeare and ſhield. Time, and the intent vvell employed, is not to be reproued. And Cicero pleading *pro Planco* ſaythe : *Otij non minus quàm negotij ratio extare debet.* Therefore to encounter any ſuche callendge , I enforce my beſt endeuer vvith the aſſured ſupply of your noble fauour, and remaine for euer (in either fortune) *pro poſſe*, your vvorſhips humble Souldier.

George North.

Io. Daniell.

THE buzzing Bee and Spyder eke, forth of one bud done finde
Both healthsome iuyce and venome vile, yet each contents his minde:
And mongst all things men choose the best, and done them daily vse,
But good men vsen good things well, bad men done them abuse.
We knowe that fire and water both, no creture can forbeare,
And yet oft times we see them both, how e they abused are.
By firie flames and flowing floudes, we see much mischiefe fall,
As countries drownde, and cities burnd, my selfe haue knowne them all:
And yet the Bee, and best men eke, which vse good things aright,
Deserue n praise by iudgement mine, in spite of spiteful spite.
And nowe George North compare may well, with good men and with Bee,
For he the worse doth hate, and best doth praise, as we may see
By booke of his, which here we may, peruse and eke behold e:
A frenchman straunge, by North his toyle an english tale hath told;
To shew what Philosophus is, if it be taken right,
And howe by corrupt worldlymen, it is abused quite.
But N. I. knewe his meaning is, that all things would be better,
If taken right, Philosophie, were from the greekish letter:
And that is, as I vnderstand, diuine wisdome to loue,
And leaue such wisdome as the world doth daily to vs moue.
Wherefore O North my friendly friend, I must needes yelde thee praises,
For that in vertue such I see thee seeke to spende thy dayes.

William Hitchcockes Gent.

THE pricking spurre doth keepe the trampling steed in awe,
The haling horse is driuen, with lashing whip to drawe,
The bearing Asse is forst, by brusing bat to toyle,
The pearcing goade doth make the painefull Oxe to moyle:
The goade, the whip, the bat, and spur, which only driue
To tende the painefull path where vertue wonts to liue,
Is praise: why then giue praise (which is the good and spur,
The whip and bat whereby each doth in vertue stur)
To him that did translate: thy selfe shalt thereby gaine
To force him for thy sake, to take much greater paine.

The

The Argument of the Booke.

GReat ſtrife hath grovvne vvith elders ſage in ſearch of ſoueraine good,
The vviſer ſort deemd Nature it, but nought they vnderſtood:
Our Soueraine good framd Nature baſe, to him vve thanks muſt yeld,
VVe vvrought ſelfe thrall, yet he in loue made gracious Chriſte our shielde.
But ſith they erred, and ſeeming graue miſtoke good on this ſort,
Giue yong men leaue for learnings ſake to ſpeake their minds in ſport.
I take our ſoueraine good to be, to liue in Court aright,
VVith prudent care to ſeeke our gaines, of artes to haue ſome sight,
In Iuſtice to do no man vvrong, to giue great thankes to vvin,
For Fame to crouch, or fight for right, ſhift poore, ſhift friend, ſhift kin,
To temper talke and deeds vvith ſuch as further may our feteh,
VVith haughtie lokes to ſhun the lavvs, and graſp vvithin our reach.
Philoſophers vvould thinke it nevve, but reaſon vvils them ſtay,
For they haue ſpoke: indifferent doome muſt beare the bell avvay.

To 62907

The Prologue, or Authors Epiſtle, to his Ladie, a louer of vertue.

I Shall now ſee moſte noble Ladye, whither the doubtfull opinion that you haue long tyme had of mee: which I haue neyther beene hythertoo able by reaſons or excuſe to remooue, may by the troth it ſelfe make you of a contrary iudgement. For it is not once, twice, or thrice that you haue reproued mee, to bee a promiſer, a deceyuer, and ſuch a one as ye perceyued (as you tolde mee your ſelfe) to bee worthy of little or no credit at all: Notwithſtanding that in all my promiſes, or any other wayes withoute promiſe, wherein my humble ſeruice might be moſt agreable and beſt liked of you, I haue not fayled, either in deſire, or execution. But this is none other than the naturall diſpoſition of you Gentlewomen, ſtill to pick ſuche quarels: when (according to your good cuſtome) you deſyre any thing, bee it neuer ſo wayghtie, weake, or daungerouſe: your longing for the ſame is ſo greate, that without conſideration, of the oportunitye, the eaſineſſe, or the poſſibilitie, you

thinke on nothing elſe, but on the neceſsitie to haue it done. And if the ende ſucceede not as you wiſhe, you lay the faulte vpon your ſeruantes, whome afterwardes you call lyars and promiſers. Yet whatſoeuer I ſay, though it bee reported to bee a common faulte in women, I will not mainteyne the ſame to bee in you: For knowing your noble minde aboue others, ſetled in ſo loftie a ſeate, as ſeeing and vewing a farre off the ſmall faultes, errours, and abuſes, wherin their Ignorance may bee wrapped: your wiſedome I nothing doubt, is able well ynough to auoyde it: beeing exempted from the common ſorte, and contrarie too ſuche wayward conditions. I will then perſwade my ſelfe, that ſuche reproche (if it may ſo bee called) commeth from a good minde, and of good will, beyng ſure that you knowe mee otherwiſe towardes you. And therefore by the waye haue ſayd it, rather to aduertiſe me, thã that I ſhould ſeeme ſuche to you, or you account ſo of mee, but rather bycauſe I ſhould become ſuch a one, euen as it often fareth with thoſe, that being in feare, commonly complayne before they feele any greefe. Yet can I not content my ſelfe with this perſwaſion, ſeeing that my affection ſeemes not to bee ſo entierlie knowen vnto you, while ye make ſo little accompt of it. Therfore

to

to gyue you better teſtimonie of that you are ſo doubtfull to beleeue, and to the end that by this argument, you maye hope for better aſſurance hereafter, of that whiche (it may be) yee ſuſpect. For (I deſire rather to ſatisfie you, than my ſelfe, thoughe I haue iuſter cauſe too ſuſpect you, than you mee) after my departure from *Paris*, expelling and chaſing from mee ſundrie fantaſies, by the abſent remembrance of your ſo good a will, whiche ordinarie preſence woulde not ſuffer: I enterpriſed this trauell, to write this little treatiſe vnto you, packing vp in this ſo ſmall a volume, the delightfull inſtructions of *Philoſophie*, and manner how to lyue: in the which we paſſed this melancholike tyme of winter, where, and in what cõpanie you knowe: mingling our other cõmon paſtimes, with this Noble diſcourſe. I am not ignorãt of the feruẽtneſſe of your deſire, to vnderſtand the troth in all things: for when as ſomtimes beeing with you, betweene our ſelues, I would aſſaye to become a good Orator: you by importunate meane, haue cõſtrained me to become a Philoſopher. And I pray you who are meeter to *Philoſophie*: that is to ſearche the knowledge of God, & of man, to know who we are, where we are, wherefore wee are, and howe wee ſhoulde gouerne and guyde oure lyues one with another,

Yong yeares meeteſt for the ſtudie of Philoſophie.

ther, than oure yonger people? VVho by reaſon of greene yeares and ſmall experience, hauing not yet their iudgementes certaine or ſetled, but wild and raſh, and till the ſcum & filth of youthfull heate bee boyled oute of them, are but little profitable to the cõmon wealthe. O what a laudable cuſtome were it, and commodious to any coũtrie, if the adminiſtration of common wealth, were not committed and put on ſuche as are yong, rude, and of no experience: and that ſuch in no wiſe ſhoulde gouerne, or giue counſell, till they were throughly tried and approued. Then the people ſhould not endure ſo muche daunger, and they in applying ſome payne to diſcretion, ſhould in the ende, be moſt profitable to themſelues: For it would be a great contentment to their life (after experience had) and ſpecially, their olde age would not be ſo melancholy, angrie, impacient, and waywarde, in digeſting all things euill. For what made *Cato* the elder, as *Cicero* in his booke *de Senectute*, ſayth, to beare his yeares ſo pacientlly, too bee ſo pleaſant. and well diſpoſed an olde man, and (which is more marueylous) to bee ioyfull and merie in yong and youthfull companie, but the great knowledge, and experience he had in all things? I feele my ſelfe to ſtray from my firſt intent, and by little and little

Experience makes age eaſie.

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to fall from my purpoſe: It is then requiſite for youth, to vſe and acquaint themſelues to a ſolitarie and contemplate life, not as Hermites in the wilderneſſe, or lyke Monkes in the Cloyſters: but ſuche a ſure and diligent meane, as they may bee capable, to informe, and inſtruct themſelues in time to all good things: So that when the ſpirite is thus framed and taught, and the furious flame of youth put out: they may the ſooner and better exerciſe the life actiue, and then take vpon them, to trauell for the common wealth of their Countrey. If my head and bearde were ſomewhat gray in ſiluer ſhewe anſwerable to this cauſe, I woulde make an inuectiue, and declame agaynſt this fooliſhe, brutiſh, and vnbridled youth, which delightes not but in vnprofitable matters, and voyde of reaſon, neuer regarding nor following other guyde than Careleſneſſe, accounting it ſhame, and reproch to be ſeene or thought to doe any thing for good purpoſe. And (if you will noble Ladie, pardon me priuately to reproue you) I cannot wonder ynough to ſee, that among you worthie Damſels, being (as you are) the iudges, patrones and preſeruers of the priuiledges of youth: howe you can commonly approue and allow thoſe vnprofitable actions, in doltes and beaſts of no courage, ſomtime proceeding of an

Ladies are the patrons and preſeruers of the priuiledges of youth.

euill nature: and yet they haue ſuch place with you, that being in your Court men lawded and glorious flatterers, you reioyce with them, and equally fauour them, as pleaſant and worthie ſeruaunts. It woulde very well become (as it ſeemeth vnto me) yong men, to employ this libertie, and pleaſant time of youthfull yeares, in the knowledge of vertue, and in other commendable exerciſes of the bodie, as wreſtling, wherin is ſhewed both valure & vertue: To the end that being ſo experimented, feeling their owne ſtrength, and comming too mans ſtate, they neede not any longer to learne how they ought to liue. For ſo ſoone as a man commes either to ſerue the common wealth, or to haue care of his houſholde: he ſhould no more be a ſcholer, but rather an inſtructer. VVho if he will after breake his braynes about *Philoſophie*, neglecting his charge, and regarding not his familie, *Plato* willes, he ſhoulde bee turned to play with nuttes among boyes, and whipped wyth roddes among children. And for this purpoſe, I deſire you noble Damſell, to reade one peece in *Plato* of *Gorgias*, beginning with this ſentẽce (for there he teacheth, why, howe, where, and when *Philoſophie* is to be vſed,) *Philoſophie* ſayth he, is an excellent thing and very ſeemely, ſo that it be vſed moderately, ſoberly, and in due

time

time of yeares: wherein if any plunge themselues too deepe, it destroyeth them vtterly. It may seeme by this, that *Plato* reproues indifferently, the perfit knowledge of *Philosophie*: yet truly he neither despiseth nor dispraiseth it, but so far as it is vnprofitable and hindreth vs from our other needfull affayres. For since that all sciences were inuented for the helpe of man, and as much for the conseruation of the Soule, the bodie and goodes, as consequently to intertayne a societie, companie, and felowship among men: To what purpose then, doe anye breake their braynes in their studies, if it be not for profite to themselues, or benefite to some others? Considering therefore that you haue your witte at libertie, rouing at will, and treading your pleasant steppes at randon, where best liketh your youthful yeres to carrie you (though it somewhat yeldeth to naturall affection) follow I pray you your first intent, and there shall want no good will in me, seeing I prepare my self to matters of greater importance than this, and other matters also, but that your desire shall be satisfied. Yet I knowe that this worde *Philosophie*, doeth founde so hatefull in the eares of manye, thoughe some false and euyll opinion they haue of *Philosophie* too them vnknowne: that they will thinke it

ſtraunge and abſurde to peruert or mar (for ſo hey terme it) ſo excellent a perfection of nature, as is in you, with ſo melancholike opinions. Therefore this I will ſay: ſeeing they neither know nor hate Philoſophie, but onely for the name, let vs leaue the worde, and ſpeake no more of it: but let vs ſay, that you do learne howe to lyue in the worlde: which all perſons do couet too knowe, and yet too liue in the worlde is no other thing than the ſame which we call or tearme Philoſophie, as we wil proue hereafter, wherein, it would greeue mee, (following my purpoſe) if you and I, ſhoulde ſo much vſe our iudgements, and with ſuch hote affection, that wee forget to knowe our ſelues, and ſo make vs mockeries and laughingſtockes to the worlde. I thinke it not good to haue my houſe of a tunne as *Diogenes* had: nor to ſcratch out my eyes as *Democritus* did: or die for hunger as hee that had his *Maliſſa*, the better too know and vnderſtand Philoſophie. But I commend and prayſe him, who making good chere, louing good wine, and ſeeking good felowſhip, can by the waye contemplate and marke the maner and liuing of euery one: and conſider of thoſe that do both good and euill, the vantage of either. In thus vſing the mother of all Sciences, ſhe will neuer make any heauie nor angrie

Philoſophie the mother of Sciences.

grie, or as (ſome report) by inordinate ſtudy malancholie: but ſhe may drawe them from manie and ſundry follies, that ſmell more brutiſhe than manlie. And if any will ſay that withoute this, euery man may liue: I dare affirme, that he is ſo farre from reaſon, as his opinion deſerues no anſwere. As for the pleaſure, deſire, and cõtentment that comes of it, thus muche may be ſayde: that if in the morning, when you attire your ſelfe amõg your maidens, the cleere chriſtall, and good looking glaſſe, delightes you, in ſhewing the perfit Image of your outward proportion: how much more ſhoulde you reioyce to beholde and ſee your ſelfe in this Science, to knowe what is your life, what it ought too bee, what you are, and what is the ſubſtance of euerie thing? Heereby you ſhall learne, howe the wyfe ought too gouerne and behaue hir ſelfe, with hir husbande: it ſheweth howe you ſhall well inſtruct and guyde your houſeholde: your little priuate common wealth ſhall be ſo neate and poliſhed, as nothing better: you ſhall know howe to vſe your ſelfe towarde ſtraungers: and you may bee aſſured by this, without reproofe to do any thing freelie, for infamie and ſlaunder ſhall no way torment you. VVhat woulde you wiſhe or deſire more? On the contrarie, withoute this knowledge, you remaine in ſu-

ſpence and doubt, like too a traueler beeing in the open fielde and preſſed on his iourney, not knowing his way: you haue no other guide, than that blinde beaſt of common and popular iudgement, who (as ignorant and vnexpert in all things) ſayeth and doth one while one thing and an other while an other. For what is more inconſtant than Ignorance? Thus being bound to this fooliſhe, variable, and common opinion, and hauing no other reaſon or councell, but to followe others: you ſhall ſoone vnderſtand in what miſeries and care you liue. Knowing therfore your ſo good affection, and to the end to deliuer you out of this priſon and miſerable darkeneſſe of Ignorance, I haue written to you this little treatiſe, altogither rude and impoliſhed, as a wanderer through the countrie: In the which you ſhall breefely ſee the ſumme of that I euer thought in Philoſophy: wherin the auncient & Sages paſt repoſed their ſoueraine bountie: Then howe it is in theſe dayes diſguiſed and masked, grounded onely on mans opinions and not on Nature: And laſt, you ſhall amply finde (yet not ſo much as I gladly would) what I thinke of this newe *Philoſophie*, which is the order and manner of liuing in theſe dayes. In writing whereof I haue played *Democrates*, & applyed the whole too a pleaſant concluſion.

Therefore

Therefore when you vnderſtande the one and the other, you will vſe it (I know) ſo diſcretely, that it ſhall not let you frō your neceſſarie cauſes, of more importance. And if in the diſcourſe of the booke, I ſpeak more vnciuilly and boldly than is meete or conuenient to your excellencie: It may pleaſe you payſe thoſe woordes and ſentences, in the balance apte and conuenient to the matter heere treated, whiche hath ofte & in many places made me forget the ſweete and gentle ſtyle that ye might deſire. To conclude, I humbly requeſt you to receyue this my little labour, as the frute of your owne poſſeſsion & inheritance: wherby I ſhall ſeeme to haue gained great profit, if it pleaſe you to preſerue it & cloſe it in the coffer of your gracious fauour: wherewith I haue nothing too wiſhe or deſire, but the immortalitie of the ſame.

The Philosophie of *the Court.*

THe auncient Philosophers past whose morall iudgementes were allowed for doctrine in their time, did all affirme that nature hath giuen vs nothing euil: and if in our life we would follow, or do no more than we are naturally enclined vnto, and that which she prescribeth, we should neuer doe any thing but well. But if wée growe deeper into consideration of the cause, and come nearer the quicke, whiche they could not so well attaine to, as we may (who haue our eyes open and cleered by him from whence proceedeth this nature, of which they speake so much, and which toke that name through ignorance of him: For who is it else that we should cal Nature, if we beleeue God to be the creator of all things?) It will manifestly appeare, that this sentence is truer than they thinke for. They say, the instinct of nature, sufficeth only to liue well: and we likewise affirme the same: yet they knowe not that the well liuing whereof we speake, is perfiter than their Philosophicall liuing, which in respect of ours is most vnlike well liuing,

liuing. Notwithstanding wæ affirme as they, and agræ with them, that nature hath giuen vs sufficient ayde and helpe tw lyue well. But to the ende wæ enter not intw errour, or sæme to depraue God of due glorie which I speake for his honour: I will not say that this nature which I now speake of, and the philosophicall reason is all one. For the nature whereof I now write, is the first nature, not corrupt or filthie, or blinde, but such as knew no sinne, nor tasted of any other thing, than the blessing of God. This I am sure hath no parte in euill: I call that euill according to the ballance and measure wherewyth wæ trie gwd and euill at these dayes, whiche is muche iuster and harder than the tryall of Philosophers. But since it hath bene corrupted and touched by oure enimye, it styll abydeth lame and vnperfite: And (that is worse) it cannot acknowledge what it was at the first, nor conceyue from whence it toke begynning, except it be lightned by a spirituall clearnesse, which these Philosophers had not. Euen so thys seconde Nature soyled in fylthe as shæ is, is the same that the Philosophers so muche speake of and meane (for they knewe no better) but this is nothing to satisfie Gods

iustice,

iuſtice, or the good lyfe requyred of vs by hym: but is rather a hurte and hinderance to the same. Yet otherwyſe to make a man iuſt, wyſe, graue, and vertuous, among men, which is the accompliſhing of the preceptes of Philoſophie, nature can doe all. For the ſpirit of man can perceyue no imperfiteneſſe in this nature bëing ſo ſpoyled, ignorant and weake: yet hauing this vnderſtanding and iudgement (whiche is abyding in this ſeconde Nature) that God hathe not made anye thing euyll: and beléeuing that this ſeconde Nature is the firſt, not corrupted but made of God as in déede it is, and that there is no other: hée wënes all to bée well, and ſuppoſes all operations proceëding from this to bée perfite good, and eſtemes whatſoeuer is done by the ſame for vertue. This is (as I coniecture) all the ſcience and ignorance of the Philoſophers. This is the knowledge of our graue and ſage fellowes of the worlde, that haue ſo arrogantly vaunted of this great dame vertue. These are the cauſes that ỹ lawes ciuil, which is part of their Philoſophie, do ſuffer ſome things repugnant to gods cõmandemẽt, as kéeping of Cõcubines, to repell by force, (which they ſay is natural) any preſcriptiõ with breach of faith, & ſuch like

We

We will therefore speake as they, and with them, but with an other intent: not intreating so much of their true vertue, as of any other disguised and masking vertue, which men doe followe and honour in steade of the right: to the end the world may know their double follie and ignorance: for hauing found this last and newe vertue, they haue not that they suppose: and thoughe they had it, yet should they haue nothing.

Nature is the mother of all good things.

Nature therefore (to speake as a Philosopher) is the mother of all good things, and the same which prouokes vs to vertue. Then it must néedes followe, that we are naturally borne to doe good, and that thée soweth in our myndes, certaine small sparckles of good will: which if we quench by wicked custome of doing euill, we ought not to impute the same to nature, for none can iustly say that naturally any is euill. These small sparkes are stirring sharp prickes, that still do moue and incourage vs, to doe those things which are good of themselues. So that after the first prouoking motion whiche commeth of nature, the alone and onely goodnesse of those causes, is the finall ende which draweth vs therevnto. This is the same that Aristotle treates of in the first of his Ethikes, who per-

perſwades what vertue is, and howe it may be knowne, saying: *Si quiſpiam rerum agendarum eſt finis, quem nos propter ſeipſam expetimus, conſtat hunc talem finem ſummum bonum, ipſumque optimum eſſe.* If there bee in our doings any ende, the which we deſire for it ſelfe: it confirmes that this ende is the ſoueraine good, and that in the ſame conſiſteth vertue. Wherefore wée muſte beléeue that if any other intent or cauſe make vs to doe anye act, than ſuche as beſæmeth honeſtie, and notwythſtanding the ſame ſéeme lawfull & laudable, yet is it not good. Vertue will bée loued only for hir owne ſake, which is a point wherin many (but of meane vnderſtãding) though of ſufficient iudgement, are oft deceyued: whẽ they ſée a man of good courage, enforce himſelf with great paine to do any thing that ſæmes good in itſelfe: as to helpe his neighbor, or well to ſerue his maſter: or to defende his ſubiects: ſo ſone as they knowe it done, they ſtraight eſtéeme him an honeſt man: nothing conſidering why he did it: either for reputatiõ to be a good man, or to be better recompenced than he deſerued, whereby he might defraude another wel deſeruer, or for feare of repꝛoch if he ſhould not do it: by which it may appéere vnto vs, that thoſe worꝛks which to vs ſæme

best are nothing worth, we must not iudge any work according to ỹ shew, but according to the cause and intent of the doer. For (as Aristotle saith) vertue and vice consist in the intent, and not in the worke. Therefore we must be more carefull to beware that ỹ shew of good deceiue vs no more, thã the apparance of euill. For a masked euill, is a double mischief: and no euil is so dangerous, as pretered & well seeming goodnesse which is called hypocrisie. Wherein Cicero toke some paine in the first booke of his Offices, at the end of the Chapter, beginning: *Sed ea animi elatio, &c.* speaking of magnanimitie, where he sayth, that it is rashly & tauntingly spokẽ: that we shoulde take in hande & interprise any hard, dangerous and worthie attempt, without desire of glorie: for that there are few found (as he affirmeth) who after they haue done any thing valiantly or worthily, are not glad to be praysed, estéeming this pompe of rurall brute, a triumphant reward of their well doing. But I beleue Cicero then thought of him selfe: for supposing that some knew him very couetous of honour, & yet would séeme noble minded & vertuous, he would not altegither separat this desire of glory frõ magnanimity.

The hope of prai se should incourage the e-

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uill to do well, and to exercise the same, by which exercise they may accustom thẽselues to vertue, that by little & little they may become good men: and when they are become such, the loue of vertue only will make them do well, and no cause else. We desire and loue many other things, not for ỳ loue of thẽselues but for ỳ loue of others, as money to be mery with, & health to be at our ease: so that hauing both mony & helth, and wanting our ease, we shuld not be satisfied. But vertue is of greater value, & of more price with vs: for she alone pleaseth vs; and we desire to do well, only for that it is good to do wel, & to none other ende. Nature thẽ makes vs loue such things as ar good: & this loue by hir, is so firmly fixed in vs, ỳ howsoeuer nature is corrupted & altred, yet is she stil inclined & drawn to ỳ which seemes to hir best: & this semblãce daily foloweth the qualitie and condition of nature. For as long as she is sound and not corrupted, so lõg good things in their perfection seme also good, and follow hir. On the contrary part, whẽ nature is corrupted, reasõ & iudgemẽt slepe, lust & appetit gouern, black semeth white, & euil good: the wickedst works seme to hir good, she catcheth holde on them, she followeth them and doeth as much mischiefe as may be, and so makes a vertue of that which in dæd is vice.

This is the same that the Poet ment, saying: *Decipimur specie recti*, The apparance of good deceyueth vs, not for that the good chaungeth, or sheweth it self at any time otherwise than it is: but our naturall iudgement being corrupt and blind, so mistakes it. Since therfore the fragilitie and weakneſſe of our nature is so great, that vnwares to vs, slæpingly, and as in a dreame, she chaungeth hirselfe: if we haue not diligent regarde (for this worlde is no other than full of allurements to vice) she being once altered, the semblance and opinion likewise altereth, & new affections enter, to serue this newe appetite, as it fareth with some king entring into his newe kingdome, where prowesse is not vsed, & the wandring mind caried indifferently either one way or other: and therefore it is commonly sayd that vertue is the centre or midst of vice: for none can so little decline to any side, but falleth into one vice or other. We ought then to be very carefull to nourish and maintaine this nature in hir simplicitie, euē as she is, before she be more decayed, and to prop hir vp on euery side, lest she ræle hither or thither. I call it ræling or staggring, when by our negligence and ignorance, we suffer our selues to be ouercome with euery fond opinion, conceyt or maner

maner of life that takes vs in the heade, and to giue hir armor and weapons, as wel to defend as to vanquish hir enimies that seke to make hir yelde, which we may easily do by ỹ true knowledge of good from euil, and not by fraud & frequentation of the world. Or rather (if it be tollerable in me to tread a little out of the Philosophers tract, & speak the truth) we ought to enforce our selues, to deface & extinguish the vice of the second nature by faith, & to reenter into ỹ purenesse & cleannesse of the first: which the Philosophers (as I haue sayd afore) knew not, as we do, and better may, if we open the gate to him that sayth vnto vs: Behold I am at your dore and knock thereat, to them that open I will enter, and eate with them and they with me.

There is nothing that doth sooner chaunge the affection and condition of mans life: or (to speake more plainly) our nature, thã cõpany. This similitude & resemblance, that all men take one of another by the capable conceyt of reason, is of so great force that like as ỹ more sort be, the rest wil seke to be like vnto them. And though some deligbt to be contrary in maner of liuing, to the place & countrey they are in, the reason is, they haue sene others do the same wher they haue bene, whiche they

follow: I denie not, but among many there are founde, that without the example of others, do straunge things of themselues, not accustomed any where: and if such actes be honest and not repugnant to reason, they are to be commended though the multitude mislike them: who estæme that onely to be wel and wisely done, which is most common among them, and most people vse: counterpaysing vertue and wisdome, with small trifles, supposing such as gouerne themselues contrarie to their order of life, to be fooles: not considering which gouernment is best. To eschue this publike reproufe, the auncientes haue sayd, we must liue according to the maner of the Countrie that we are in, which is to be vnderstanded only in outward gesture and indifferent causes. For they will vs not, if in what Countrey soeuer we be, is vsed any custome contrarie to vertue or reason, to approue and allow the same. Therefore we desire stil to folow others in their actions, as though vertue remayned in the vulgar peoples doings, whē there is nothing in ỹ world so ignorant, so blind, and so vndiscrete, as the people: who without iudgement, wanting all consideration, and cleane voyde of reason, so pursue and approue their first determinations:

tions: and that if their doings, or enterpryses fal out well, it is fortune: euen as a blind man shoulde wander in a darke vnknowne place, none would say he did it by cleareneſſe of his sight, but at aduenture. For this cause, the lawes haue forbidden seditious companying and vnlawfull assemblies, for that the most part of men are euill, peruerse, and subiect to their appetites and fœlish affections, so as the terrible and monstrous mæting of the vulgar sort, doe commonly conspyre, and debate of mischæuous matters. Cicero pleading for Cn. Plancus, was accused of publike bryberie, for that in the election of the Ediles, his parte was preferred before one named Lateranensus, a man notable vertuous, and of an honourable house: after he had shewed in popular election, the fauour of the people to be more of value than the dignity of ỹ person, which they regard not: there is (saith he) neither coũsel, iudgement, reason, or discretiõ in the people: and our predecessors were euer of this opinion, that the deuices, determinations, & deliberations of the cõmon multitude shuld rather be dissimuled thã alowed. Being then conuersant in the world, and familiar in worldly causes, approuing the vulgar opinion of others, we shall easily accustome our selues to doe that is euill. For so long

as the smal sparks of vertue be extinguished in vs, and that we abandon or leaue to folow the fashion of the Court, we shall become expert masters in euil: so apt & capable we are to learne it (as Iuuenal sayth) *Quoniam dociles imitandis Turpibus ac prauis omnes sumus.*

This custome to do euil, and thus to liue, so chaungeth and altereth our nature, not knowing good from euill, as it makes vs neither to couet the one or shunne the other: we account good, and preferre to be the soueraine good, that which best pleaseth vs, & is alowed good in the world: and in the felicity & delight of men, we repose and determin our vertue. For the vertue of man consisteth not in that which is only good of it selfe, folowing the opinion of Philosophie: but in that which seemeth to them good, & is no other than a certaine maner of liuing, or rule in life. And since it is diuers, according to the diuersitie of Countries & people, as in times past were many sects of Philosophers, we wil treat of that which is most allowed, & embraced (for that it is more masked and disguised than the others) which is Courtly life. The knowlege wherof, we may aptly cal in these days Philosophie. And this I mind to treate of, bicause that they that know it & can vse it, are counted wise men and Philosophers.

The definition of this Philoſophie.

OUr new and mozall Philoſophie may thus be defined: A certaine & ſound iudgement, howe to liue accozding to the good grace and faſhion of the Court. I am ſure this definition cannot bee pleaſing to euery one: foz ſome pzofeſſers of Artes, which peraduenture moze ſubtiller & accozding to the Stoikes maner, touch things nærer, will ſay vnto mæ, that the ſame ozder of liuing can be nothing leſſe, oz farther vnlike to the pzopertie of Philoſophie: foz all Philoſophie conſiſteth in the knowledge of ſecrete & hidden cauſes, and in that which no eye can diſcerne. But to liue Courtly, oz accozding to the maner of the Court, conſiſteth in certaine ſmall humanities, and chiefly in outward apparances: wherevnto I will anſwere, that the minor is not true: foz though a Courtier may bee knowen by his countenance, geſture, and behauiour (which is our Philoſopher) as they may all other kinde of people, yet the true ſcience cõſiſteth not only in the ſame. But rather it is impoſſible foz any to gouern themſelues ſo well, to haue a

Courtly grace & entertainement, if they perfectlye vnderstande not the opinions of the Court. For (as they? maister Aristotle sayth) all actions & operations procæde of true vnderstãding & knowledge: and how may wee be singular in that which we vnderstãd not? None therfore cã be a good Courtier, onlesse he vnderstand what pleaseth best & is most liked at ỹ Court: & to giue *Beso los manos*, after the Spanishe maner, to embrace with lowe reuerence, and to make a braue coũtenance, with other such like, suffiseth not: as I may aptlie applie for example, oure maysters of Artes, who haue mouths to kisse, armes to embrace, and faces to countenance, & can do all this well: yet were it straunge to see one of them in his old girded gowne furred with white, his burnt pantosles, & his night cap of fræse, to fall on daunsing & spurting amõg fayre Ladies. How he would courte it with them, how hee would please and entertaine them, & how he would rauish their hartes or allure them? whẽ neyther his wanton loke, or smiling cheare, his humble curtesie, nor lowe embracing, (though they would suffer it) would serue him amõg them, if he be reputed wise, or wel learned. And why so? Because those reuerẽces are not wel pleased, & beseme

beſéeme not a man of iudgemente and knowledge, to pleaſe ſuche companie. For if hée did, hée woulde bée otherwiſe apparelled, and muſter in gallanter manner: hée woulde frame a courtlie countenance, and ſéeme gentle, modeſt and pleaſante, preparing his ſprighles to ſpeake and vnderſtand nothing but mery & gladſome purpoſes. And thus finely furniſhed with his little Page in place of his poore & ragged ſcholler, he might peraduenture bée welcome. Lette vs then mayneteyne and holde this for a maxime or principle, that to gouerne our ſelues accoording to the Courte, wée oughte and muſte haue the true vnderſtanding of the opinions of the Courte, & vertues of the ſame, whiche obtayned, will make vs in all our actions to be comelie, honeſt, and vertuouſe, and to bée eſtéemed graue, wiſe, and ſounde of iudgement: from the which proceedeth this *Decorum generale*, generall comelineſſe, that Cicero ſpeaketh ſo much of in his Offices: & ſayeth, that it may better be conceiued in imagination, than vttered by cunning: whiche wée maye nowe terme the good grace of euery one, whereof wée wyll treate more hereafter. So that yf anye woulde indeuer them ſelues to doe ſuche things, and wante

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the true knowledge hereof, they shall fayle of their purpose, while supposing to winne honor and praise, they may cause themselues to bee derided of euery man, as is commonly seene in these rude youthes, & skilleſſe minions of the Court, great companions & woers of the Citie, Counterfaite Courtiers who the simper it in outwarde shewe, making prety mouthes, & marching with a stalking pace like Cranes, spetting ouer their own shoulder, speaking lispingly, & answering singingly, with perfumed gloues vnder their girdels their buskins pinkt & cut, their short clokes, their little cappes, their heare curled after ỹ maner of Cesarea, somtimes a little lõg locke turned vp like a pigs tayle betweene their tẽples & the eare: And in this attire, with a word or two of Frẽche, Italian, or Spanish, which they cary in their budgettes, they dare deuise with any noble person of the affayres of the realme, & pronoũcing with a maiesty, how the king hath shewed greate fauour to such a gentleman. Of these it may be saide, as heretofore was saide of the Philosopher, hee hath a fayre beard, shaue him, & take away all his wisedome. So take frõ these minions these kind of habits or apparell which I haue described, and you shall finde them beastes,

beastes, doltes, loutes and clowntes. But though ye do not, those, whose eyes are of reasonable iudgement, can discerne them well ynough.

After wee haue thus giuen the definition of our Philosophie: & shewed both the argument & reasons, we haue to call these causes so defined Philosophie: It seemeth very meete, to speake of the effect therof, which is vertue. For the end of Morall Philosophie, is grounded onely on vertue: wherevnto none can attaine, but by the meane of this science. And I beleue without searching any further, or making so many distinctions of Genus & Species, as the ouer scrupulous and curious haue done, that in taking one parte of our former definition, wee haue the same of our vertue. The which by a certaine and shorte diuision, in forme of a description wee shall plainelyer and better shewe hereafter. Vertue is a manner of lyuing according to the manner of the Courte, and differeth from the Philosophie of the Auncientes, in that their vertue (as I haue sayde afore) is to liue according to the instinct of Nature: and ours is to lyue according to the manner of the Courte. And euen as it was auncientlye affirmed,

firmed, that if wee followe Nature and doe no more than oure naturall reason sheweth vs, wee shoulde neuer doe euill: so, if wee followe the manner and customes, in due and true order of the Courte, wee shall euer doe that is seemelye, good, and well. For who is so rashe, foolishe, or madde, that wyll saye any thing is euyll donne, whiche is donne by a Gentleman Courtier, well instructed. Maye wee not then call them beasts, and doltes, which are ignorant of the prycе and valewe of oure Courtly vertue? It makes me remẽber the old *Atticque*, who vnderstode not the phrases of an eloquente Orator, when hee spake a woord most meete and well placed to the behoofe of the poore beaste: hee scorned him for his labour. The propertie of ignorance is too brutishe and intollerable, who as they are not content with that they cannot doe or deuise any thing of themselues: so will they not regarde or esteeme that for wel which the wise and learned do say. Hereof it is that Cicero speaketh so much in his oration *pro A. Cluen.* nighe to the myddest. Therefore seeing the Courte and Courtlye countenance is the onely rule whereby and whereupon wee muste guyde and frame our life, it is not to bee marueled

led at, if good wyttes well borne, and desirous to attayne to this perfection of vertue. doe earnestlye aske, and diligentlye enquyre of commers and goers from and to the Courte for newes: What doe they? What saye they? What manner of lyuing is there nowe among them? What sortes of apparell, what sportes, what fashyons newlye forged? who is beste welcome, most regarded, and in greatest estimation? who is most braue? who is the trimmest dauncer, the pleasantest deuyser, and the beste dawter? what authors are moste alowed, what bookes reade they, what songs carryeth the brute? And a thowsande other lyke demaundes. For howe shoulde wee else nowe knowe the meane of lyuing with the good preceptes and doctrine of the auncient Philosophers paste, and chefelie of those that are not wrytten, or of suche whose bookes are partlye loste, as Pythagoras, Socrates, Cratippus, and others, and of the Noble & valiant Romanes: if it were not had frō tellers of tales & carryers of newes. Leaue of then to reproue our English men, & to say, that it were requisite and needeful to place certaine persons in highwaies, that should haue none other occupation, but to report & tell newes

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to those that passe by: why shoulde their vehement desire (not curiositie) to vnderstand newes, which I greatly allow, be any way reproued or touched: And euen as the good and famous lyues of oure elders, whose examples do greatlye stirre vs vp to vertue, woulde bee profitable for vs, yf by writing wee shoulde knowe them, (whiche is the principall argumente whereby Cicero sheweth the benefite and vtilitie of letters, in pleading for the Poet Archias) so howe coulde so manye wyse and honest Philosophers of the Courte, serue to the example of those that neuer sawe them: were it not for the reporters and blasers of newes: And further suche reportes encourageth, euen those that are spoken of to indeuour themselues to doe better: for the Philosophye whereof wee treate, importeth not the same that the Auncientes dothe: who woulde haue vs, withoute any hope of honour to embrace and followe vertue for the loue of hir selfe: but that wee shoulde or ought to liue vertuously, to the ende to obtayne honor and reputation, as well to oure selues, as to oure posteritie, whereof it is sayde *Virtutis merces gloria*: Honour is the guerdon and reward of Vertue. And truelye

I beléeue, if other teſtimonie might haue bin had of Ciceros conſcience (whome I name ſo oft for the excellencie of the man) than by his owne writings: we ſhould find, that in troth honor made him attempt and execute many things, eſpecially he aboue all the other Romaines: which it appeareth he could not altogither ſo couertly conceale, by this place laſt alledged. What ſhall I ſaye of poore Ouid, when he was in exile in that barbarous coũtrie of *Scythia* neare the Sea coaſt: hauing there no companie that would commend him when he had made any verſes, as they dyd when he was at Rome in his brauerie and full of poetic conceytes: he had there no longer courage to do any thing, for his pleaſant bayne lefte him, as he doth excellently wryte to Seuerus *de Ponto*.

Impetus ille ſacer, qui vatum pectora nutrit
Qui prius in nobis eſſe ſolebat, abeſt

The heauenly force that fraughtes with ſtore
of skill, each Poets prudent hed
(Which homely harbor eſt before
was wont with me to take) is fled.

The reaſon hereof foloweth after.

Excitat auditor ſtudium, laudataque virtus
Creſcit, & immenſum gloria calcar habet.
Hic mea cui recitem? &c.

The eare to studie sturres,
Each vertue prayſed growes,
Each glorie gayneth ſpurres
As gayned glorie flowes.

Let vs conclude, that the commoditie of true reporters and faithful coūters of newes, is great, necessarie and profitable to good life. But to returne to oure purpose, the vertue whereof we speake, is wholly set and placed in the court: euen as the same of the auncients is placed in nature: whiche we maye more better and perfitlier vnderstande, if in following the precepts and order of such Philosophers as are least scrupulous or precise, we deuide it into foure kyndes: as Wisedome, Justice, Magnanimitie, and Temperance, whiche are the foure fountaines or springs from whence procēdeth the perfection of honestie. And though they be so wel lincked together, that the one can not goe without the other (for who will cal any vertuous, be they neuer so profounde and wise, if they be not true and iust:) and that the four together and not one alone, make a man to be accounted wise: yet the diuision and partition is not altogither vnprofitable, to the ende that by a certayne disposition so framed, we maye the easilyer iudge to what parte or place of

honestie

honestie every action ought to be referred, to instructe the rude and learners. For in all sciences, it sufficeth not alone to vnderstande the Arte: but also we ought to haue the Methode to teach as Cicero sayth, *de legibus.* ii. *Non solùm scire aliquid artis est, sed quedam est ars etiam docendi.* It is better therefore to speake distinctly, and by order of euery one of these seuerall kyndes (whereof vertue is composed as of an harmonie) than by vndiscrete order or rashe confusion, to speake generally of vertue.

Yet before we enter into priuate or particular iudgement of vertue, and the better to finde the ways into this pleasant Garden, where groweth that greate and fayre tree in whose top she is placed: it shall be verie good we kepe one pathe, as vpon a planke or bridge, and holde this for a principall poynte that followeth. The Auncientes among other preceptes of theyr Philosophie: the easilyer to set forth and make knowne their vertue, would at the beginning giue this for a maxime, *Nosce te ipsum*: knowe thy selfe, affirming, that if by this meane a man once knewe himselfe, he shoulde finde something in him lyke to the Goddes: the which participation with the deitie, ought to bridle vn

with shame from doing euill, and pricke him forward to do well. And there is in this short sentence, and vnder these two wordes, much matter of great efficacie and force: for the better vnderstãding whereof, I wil discharge my selfe by Cicero, in the end of his first boke of lawes. And whereas oure Philosophie springs from an other fountaine than theirs whiche proceedeth onely out of nature, and oures of the contentmente and pleasure of men: So are the wayes sundry to finde the diuersitie of these two. I thinke it good therfore that to come to this perfection of our vertue, in stead of knowing ourselues, we ought to see and knowe the worlde: for after a perfite iudgement of the whole, we shall the better vnderstand one part. And when we haue the knowledge of sundrie fashions of liuing, the contrarietie of some, and the diuersitie of others, it giueth an intire and true vnderstãding of this: and further, amongst all other the excellencie of this will so mightily draw, and so strongly allure good wittes and gentle courages, that all other orders of life left and shaken off, they only will followe this, which is the fashions of the Court. But to the ende it may be vnderstanded, what I call seeing of the world, it is not to mounte on horseback,

and

and ryde from hence to *Paris*, and from thence to *Rome*, from *Rome* to Mounte *Synay*, from Mount *Synay* to seeke S. Patrikes Purgatorie, and from thence to the *Antipodes*, and so to the *Canibales*. For to see the worlde, is not to see many buildings or countries, or to passe sundrie Seas, though it be somewhat to the purpose, and that by it maye partly be knowne the same I speake of: yet I meane, seeing of the world is to vnderstande the customs, lyuing, and maners of sundrie nations, with their properties and faculties, and the conuersation they vse one to the other. And thus may we do and not trauel far for it, as beeing in some famous and notable Citie (whereunto is great resorte of diuers straungers) we may make a perfit impression in our myndes of that we see, and sometimes, it is otherwise attayned vnto by reading in bookes. The proofe whereof is perceiued by sundrie, whereof some haue past moste part of the worlde, and mustred in all the Campes that haue bin in many yeares, they can accounte to vs the platformes of Cities, Forts, and Churches, the situation of Townes, the discription of countries, and other notable things, as much as is possible to be tolde, and as the eye maye at any time see: others that hans their whole

life time remayned at the Courte, at *London*, at *Paris*, at *Venice*, at *Rome*, at *Lyons*, at *Antwerp*, and suche frequented Cities, celebrated with most resorte of people: are notwithstanding very beastes, and haue no more knowledge than a poore peasant, whiche neuer was out of the sight of his parishe steeple, sauing that they can playe on the bytte a litle better, and march more delicately and stately. The reason is, for that the one sorte are so abathed & astonied at the suddaine change of those newelties and rare deuises they see in straunge countries, which seemes to alter in a moment, that the iudgement of their sprightes is therby so troubled, as it cannot conceiue the perfection of any thing right: whereat they are so lightly moued, as they resemble brainelesse fooles, that run so fast through the street they regard not what they see, where they are, nor what place it is they be in. And the others are so accustomed with ỹ sight of one only thing, that this custome and familiarity of daily seeing it, doth so weary & dull their minds, that they take no hede of them, neither esteeming or accounting more of it any way at all, than of that they neuer saw. Hereof it is, that Cicero speaketh so much in the. ii. booke *de Natura Deorũ*, giuing this reason, why the *Atheistes* did

not

not acknowledge ỹ there was but one God by his workes, seeing the heauens, the planets & starres, the earth, the elementes, & other wonderfull workes of his, saying: *Sed assiduitate quotidiana & consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi, neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper viderunt, perindè quasi nouitas ipsa nos magis, quàm magnitudo rerũ debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare.* Which is to say: that our senses are so dull and glutted, with that our eyes doe daily see and beholde, as it is no maruell to vs, neither doe we consider howe it cõmes to passe, or howe it was made, nor who is the cause, as thoughe the rareneſſe rather than the greatneſſe or excellencie of anye thing shoulde make vs the more to wonder. It is then the mynde and imagination of man onely, that seeth and vnderstandeth any thing in his perfit kinde: the which we should dayly sturre vp, and so accustome with good purposes, that it decaye or ruste not in vs: wherby seeing and discerning with iudgement the maners & liuing of all natiõs, we maye the easilier and truelyer knowe ours: And by the same vnderstanding come to the perfection of our vertue. For the good credite and praise whereof, I may boldly say and affirme, that there is no easier meane,

nor pleasanter manner of liuing than in our Philosophie: As for the world past I list not to meddle withall, nor search how the auncient Philosophers (whose doctrine serues litle to our purpose) found or liked it in their days. But sure I am, that time hathe euer since, brought his alteratiõ. And as touching death the dissoluer of their Philosophie, to expell the feare of him, they haue spoken marueilously, and in most of their workes haue prescribed the despising of death vnto vs: yet in my opynion it coulde not but greatly greeue them: for the ground and foundation of their profession, whiche is nature, was cleane put out and cut off by it. I reporte me to Menippus in *Lucian*, who viewed all that past the floud *Acheron* to hell: and sawe none but that bashed and were astonied in the going in, except Diogenes, which did nothing but scoffe and iest at all things: who as he euer contẽned life, so was he neuer seene fearefull of death at any time. Most true it is that Socrates farre off, had a good courage and seemed to despise it, but when he came to the wicket, he chaunged coloure as well as others. Let vs nowe proceede to the purpose, and speake of our vertue in hir seuerall kynds by order, without confusion.

Of

Of Prudence or wisdome.

THis noble *Troy* wherein (as I haue saide) our vertue is seated, hath foure armes or branches, whereby we must ascend & climb vp vnto hir: the first principal & chief braunch we cal Prudence, which consisteth in a skilful iudgement and knowledge of true things. For it is impossible that by our daily doings, we can wel please the world, if we know not throughly what we do. From this knowledge proceedes the vnderstanding of all Artes and liberall Sciences, whereby we become right Courtiers: As of Musicke, the playing on the Lute, the Gitterne, the Citrone, the Harpe, the Cornet, the Flute, the Virginals, the Viall, and other swete musical instruments. Also to daunte all maner of daũces: as the double & simple braules of *Burgonie*, *Poitowe*, and *Champanay*, the base daunce, the Almayne, the Gallyard, the Cinquepase, and infinit others. The Arte to compose deuices, Poses, pleasant purposes, Songs, Sonets, and Ballats, or amorous Lamentacions, in prose, verse, or ryme, very pitifull and in Tragicall manner, as beseemes the languishing paine of a seruant being in displeasure, and euill rewarded of his mistres:

Further, it is singular good, to haue some prettie sprinkled iudgement in the commõ places and practizes of all the liberall sciences, chopt vp in hotchpot together, out of the which we may still help ourselues in talke, with apte deuises at assayes, to haue substance and matter to treate of, and encounter with all maner of things, and no more. Also to haue store of histories, to passe the time meet for any company, and with the more assured cunning to couche our credits, it shall not be amisse to enterlace our discourses with certeine suddaine lyes and inuentions of our owne forging. Likewise the knowledge of diuers and sundry languages, as the spanish, the Frenche, the Italian, the Dutche, and others: to the ende that in all these seuerall tongues, we may salute, reioyce, wonder at, exclayme vpon, disdayne, skorne, and floute whome we will. The knowledge of Fence, of vaulting, of Tennis, of dauncing, and other sportes of exercise: And some vnderstanding of the state and affayres of the Realme, as of warres, of practizes, of marchandice, and howe we maye honestly robbe, deceyue, and make our best profite. And withall, certayne other small pettie practizes and traffiques, that are vsed in the world,

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in which euery one couets to excell, for the commendable consideration that cõmes of it. On the contrarie, such as are ignorant in these faculties, and will not endeuer themselues to haue some smacke or smell in euery one of them, are beastes, dolles, and calues. And for that Vertue is the meane betweene two vices, as it is commonly in contrarie occurrences: when the two extremities are knowne, the midst is easily founde, which is our vertue. Prudence then (as we haue said) is the perfite path way and iudgement to all the artes afore spoken of, wherin is to be vnderstanded, that I measure this perfection, not according to the rigoure, but reputation of the Court. And he, who is so thoroughly expert in the sciences, that he knoweth thereby howe to aduaunce his credite and honour, is perfite, and worthy to be called wise. But this meane (that I speake of) is so hard to kæp, that there are few which declyne not to the one side or the other. Some beléeuing wel of themselues, that they are singular in these arts, and yet want the true trade to beginne, weigh things lightly, regarding neither place time, nor counsel: wherupon they are accoũted wilful & rash. Others that would be estéemed more graue & sage thã the rest, do muse

and

& breake their braynes with trifling follies which serue to no purpose, and there aboutes spende inestimable paine & time: & these are too curious. Take therefore the meane betwæne both, and you shall come to the true and entire knowledge of thinges honest and necessarie: and so you haue oure vertue. From temeritie and rashnesse it is not néedfull to disuade any by morall reasons: for there are so manye infected with this follie, and their wilfulnesse winnes them such contempte in the worlde, as they are noted and scoffed at of all men: and I belæue the wise beware by them since they knowe the remedie. Walke one night through *Paris*, and you shall finde a companie of yong gallants, some braue and in good order, and others smothly combed for the purpose, courting and woing their Ladies: and for that they are so vnskilfull howe the knowledge of this Philosophie maye bring them into their mistres fauour, belæue of themselues to be passing excellent and singular good players on the Lute and Citterne, and do nightly walke the streates before their louers gates, tearing the poor strings of their instrumentes, as it were in despite of Mercurie. Their Mistreses be of so mylde nature (some suche there are) that they

they account this the greatest glorie & most delight in the world, to heare how their amorous seruantes, with sundrie sorts of musicke present their louing obedience. As it is sayde of a Dame in *Rhoane*, who to trye the loyaltie of hir Louer, made a crosse with chaulke on hir chamber dore, and enioyned him penãce, nightly to come and kysse it, who was so deuout that he thought it sacrilege to breake tyme with his mistres: till some merie mate spying and pitying his incessant paine, to further his deuotion, mending the workemanship of this reliq̃e with such supple substãce as the poore penitent, hauing bothe his nose and lippes parcell gilt withall, gaue ouer his Pilgrimage for euer. So these pigions holdẽ thus by the nose, and fed peraduenture with a farewell from some kynde Mistresse, who knowes howe to continue their follie: doe nowe and then mẽete with odde remembrances. As when their haunt happeth to be wher dwelleth some braue philosopher of the court, whose delicate eares cannot indure so great iniurie done to Orpheus, by their disordred scraping and crouding, do blisse them out at their windows with a pispot, perfuming both the players and their instrumentes, in suche swẽete maner, as the gallantes are not heard of in

of in a moneth after. Some other supposing themselues perfit daũcers, for that they haue heard say it is an excellent grace not to seeme to haue care or to thinke of their daunce, do in dauncing before noble damsels, frame their countenance with a counterfet modestie, and letting their cape slip off the one shoulder to shewe their gay ierkins or dublets, kæping euer this good mean, that it may be supposed they deliuer their trippes and trickes easily, without labour or regarde of their daunce, by little and little lets it fall off on the chamber floure: And thus the gallants glorying in their own shadowes, tread their two simples with a double tricke, and beleeue they haue done singularly well, I leaue to common coniecture, howe the lokers on doe laugh at it. Another poore fole, yet a Gentleman of countenaunce, who thinkes him selfe learned in languages, trauelling by the way, and taking vp his lodging where lieth a Gentlemã Italian, for that he wil seem to haue language, salutes him with *Bonne iourne*, although it be very late: the Italian supposing him in a mockerie to pronounce *Bougeronne*, without demaunding any more, draweth out his rapier: our mynion mated to see this suddaine furie, not knowing the cause, is cõpelled to defende himselfe: & so they are both in danger the one

to maime or marre the other vpon this fond & foolish quarell. Poore soules haue patience, & consider howe your ignorance makes you no better than brute beastes. And if I durst speake of Orators, who suppose of thẽselues to haue double iudgements in al maner of sciences, for one litle word that they would perfectly to be vnderstand and eloquently vtter, being of small consequence, will trauell so far about for it, that some of them are neuer able to come to their matter againe. And touching Aduocates and lawyers, who will seem with their store of law to carie al before them, whẽ they vnderstãd neither ỹ point, but, nor mark of the cause wherevnto they should tend their talk: which ỹ good scholemaster Quintiliã doth declare: for after (saith he) they haue grauely with a long preface pleaded in latine and french iũbled togither, their clients case, in ỹ end *Parturiunt montes. &c.* that is, Huge mountaines trauell with yong, and at length bring forth a sillie Mouse. They open the principall places, & after cõpare the lawes, doctors, chapters, & cãnons togither: yet cõmonly they fortefie that part most which is least assaulted, & suddenly somtimes ouerthrow thẽselues. Cepasius maior a *Romane*, whõ Cicero painteth so gallantly pleading for Cluencus, was a cunning doer herein. Now

None can sufficiently declare the great iniuries and other inconueniences that chanceth in enterprises of importance, as in the feates of warre and pollicie, in marchandise, in phisicke, and diuinitie it selfe, through this rashnesse: for example, rashe Tylers ofte breake their owne neckes. And to conclude, there are so many examples of rashe, brainesicke, and headstrong people, that their vice is so noted, as it nèedes no more reprofe. The remedie to avoyde the falling into the faulte of rashenesse, is to consider of all causes not suddenly, but with discretion, deliberation, and good councell.

The other vice and extremitie of Prudence, is Curiositie (as we haue sayde afore) whiche is no lesse daungerous than this last we haue treated of, yet is it much more painefull: for the rashe man executes his determinations and purposes without studie or iudgement, the curious man with great circumstaunce tormentes himselfe daye and night, and both of like substance and profit. The great Philosopher Plutarch in a certaine treatise, wher he defineth what Curiositie is: compareth the curious man to a housholder a very euill husbande, who hath euer his nose out at his windowe, viewing and noting the doings

and

and gouernment of other men, and not regarding nor hauing eye to his owen familie, whose seruantes and barlettesin the meane tyme doe spoyle and robbe him within his dores. That man is double blinde in hys owne euill, that killeth himselfe with others cares, trauelles, and toyles: and yet his busynesse no whit the soner done. Wee wyll call him Curious in oure Courtlye Philosophie, that breaks his braines in searching the secretes of suche Artes and Scyences, as serue to no purpose for the instruction of oure lyfe according to vertue, that is to saye, according to the manner of the Courte. Lette vs then consider howe farre suche a one swarueth from Prudence or wisedome: yet there are manye in these dayes that treade the steppes of the auncyent Sages, and thereby seeke to attayne to this true and perfect vertue (as they call it) whiche is lodged so hyghlie and statelie, and in a place so harde and daungerous to come to. You shall see some suche curiouse men in the Courte, solemne, sadde, and melancholike, that will not eate but at prescribed houres, they will not speake but when it pleaseth them, they wyll not laughe for the Pope, nor bee subiect to anye Prince or

Lorde, bee hee neuer so greate: euer cõtrarying & misliking of that which others do: and to conclude, they are not pleasante to anye person. To what ende or purpose serueth this greate curiositie, onelesse it gyueth occasion to the worlde, to call them precyse fooles and seruants to *Signour Monarche*? Whē shall they with their glosed hypocrisie obteyne the fauour and good reputation of honest Gentlemen and ciuil Courtiers? neuer. If another *Diogenes* should come amõg them, with his staffe and his wallet, blowing and supping his wortes in his tunne, would not the Pages roll him vp and downe: But if he were a *Menippus*, or Fryer Iohn of Saincte Anthonies order, they woulde prayse him better. There are to be found infinite numbers verye curiouse in thousandes of small follies, most vnprofitable and seruing to no purpose, & yet will seeme great wise men & of singular knowledge: as prognosticators, Southsayers, Magicians, and Alkumistes, notwithstanding these laste haue beene of late, and yet are welcome and well allowed of some for the time. But I beleeue their credit will not haue place long. It sufficeth to knowe so muche of their sciences, as may serue to passe pleasante discourses among

companie, and no moze. Foz the reſte, it is nothing to our vertue, but rather hindzeth and letteth from attayning the true & honeſt meane that ſhould bzing vs to the perfection therof. And thus you haue the ſumme of that whiche in oure Philoſophie is called Pzudence, oz Wiſedome.

Of Iuſtice.

IUſtice being nert and aduaunceing hir ſelf in hir ozder, is the ſame vnto the whiche we muſt referre all our other concluſions, & without the which the whol hath no part in vertue. Foz to what end oz purpoſe doth the knowledge of any art oz ſcience pzofit vs, if the ſame be learned onely foz fraude and deceyte? Yow may wee iuſtly call oz accompte any of a noble harte and inuincible minde, able to frounte all foztunes, if hee employ and indeuoure himſelfe to harme and iniurie others? Are not modeſte men and thoſe that dawnte their appetites, and ſubdue their affectiõs to reaſon, wozthy to be termed Juſte? Without Juſtice no vertue could cõtinue, ſtand, oz ſhould be ſuppozted Therfoze we ought to take greate paine, & employ all our ſtudies to the true knowledge of hir.

And for that she is of so mighty a maiesty as hir braunches cannot in bræfe definition bee cõprehẽded, we wil in some sort describe thẽ. I am not altogither ignorant that ỹ vulgare opinion of Justice is a sure & perfect mind, to giue and do to euery man, that belõgeth vnto him: which truly is meete & very requisite. But since it sæmeth vnto mæ, either that it cõprehẽdeth much more, or else that it ought not (which belõgs vnto it) to be vnderstãded so generally, as the same shall næde more expositiõ or explication thã Justice hir sélfe, I meane not to vse it for a definition. For a beginning or principle it is a true maxime, as Cicero sayeth, & to be considered of, in the whole deduction of Justice: That it is very good, not to iniury or wrong any. & I thinke for the perfect accõplishment of this vertue, it suffiseth not onely to iniury no person (as we will shew hereafter) but we must also endeuor our selues to doe good to others: yet must we not vnderstande, that in doing no good where wée ought, though wée take nothing from him that is his, we do him wrõg: that were a suttell supposer, & suche captious opinions are damnable. For we say not that to leaue pleasuring of him whome wée very wel might pleasure, is doing him any wrõg

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The Justice wherof we write, may be diuided, though hardly, into Legal & Moral: whose difference cannot without greate difficultie be knowne, for the nærnesse of affinitie that is betwæne them, onlesse we make some diuision, and treate of them seuerallye, to the ende it may bee discerned wherein they bee contrary, and wherin they agree. All Justice be it Legall or Moral, is diuided in two kinds: wherof the one propertie or kind is Commutatiue, & the other Distributiue: And I beleeue in my opinion, that out of this last Distributiue, Cicero hath drawen liberalitie, which he makes & affirmes to be one part or mẽber of Justice, in his offices. Under these two kinds of Justice, is confirmed, included, & consisteth the whole actes & doings in ỹ mutuall society of mans life. This is the same vertue that is sayd to be the theater or place of humaine felowship, vnder the which all people are boũd & ioyned one with the other, & by the whiche euery one is warned from deuiding & separating thẽselues asunder out of this companie. Notwithstanding, after the time that the good disposition and affection of men, proceeding onely of nature, was ouerthrowen and corrupted (as I haue sayde at the beginning) and that the Goddesse Astrea had

lefte the worlde, for that mankind began to deuide, scatter, and leaue the one the other (as Ouide doth excellently describe in his *Metamorphosis*) and that this societie and conuersante cõpanying of men lost familiar felowship, cleane contrarie to the will and intent of him that placed them here: It hath bene and is needefull to giue them reynes, & bits, to bridle, bynde, hold in, and entertaine themtogither: which are the lawes Ciuill, wherby such men as at the first of their owne naturall accorde, were good, iuste, and loyall, are now constrayned to follow Justice, not hir selfe, for shee hath lefte and forsaken the earthe, but one so like hir as maye bee. And those that lyue and gouerne themselues in suche orderly sorte, as the lawes cannot reprehend them, nor any way touch them, wee say, to haue in them Justice Legall: the which howe muche it is different from this firste Justice, whiche was before the gyuing and constituting of lawes, and that whiche is the same of the Auncient Philosophers, in whose place ours is succeded, I leaue for this tyme to thinke of. Notwithstanding I may saye thus muche, that the lawes Ciuill forbidde all offices, so farre onely as they

they are borne, nourished, and raigne among men. But the Philosophers forbidde all that they imagine in their myndes to bee contrarye to reason: whiche commaundementes are ouer strayghte and rygorous. This argumente is Ciceros (and therefore I will not seeme to deceyue him) in his Offices, where hee sayeth: *Aliter leges, aliter Philosophi tollunt astutias: Leges, quatenus manus tenere possunt, Philosophi, quatenus ratione & intelligentia.* Nowe further to oure purpose.

Of Iustice Legall, and of the Lawes Ciuill.

LEgall Iustice, commeth of obseruing the ciuill lawes, the keepers whereof are called iuste, and good: whiche hathe beene heretofore diuyded in Commutatiue and Distributiue: wherein wee haue followed the opinion of the auncientes, and also of Melancton, that Noble personage and beste Philosopher in oure tyme, as appeareth in one Epitome, whiche hee made of Morall Philosophie, whiche notwithstanding is contrary to this.

In this diuision is comprised all that oure Counsellers and lawe makers haue writ-ten: whose volumes, studies, trauelles, and workes beeing gathered togither, haue made an entyer and perfect bodye: yet there haue bene many good doctors, that haue written sundry matters, which smell neither of Cō-mutatiue nor Distributiue. The Commu-tatiue consysteth in causes touching con-tractes, titles, obligations, and actions: and consequently in the right of any, to knowe who vseth or enioyeth that hee hath rightful-ly or no: who may contract or bargayne, and wherefore wee may contract or no: Of con-tractes, some are voluntarie, as buying, selling, hyring, lending, gyuing, and others, of the which doth also proceede supposed con-tractes, whence commeth the ryghte of suc-cession. The others are compelled or con-straynd: as all crymes and offences: so that moste part of the Ciuill lawes are com-prehended in Commutatiue. And it is called Commutatiue, for that the firste kinde of contracting and bargayning, whiche was then in custome and vsage, was commu-tation or exchaunge: For at the begin-ning, before this poysoned infection of money was forged, the good people of the

worlde

worlde did chaunge that which they might spare, for that that they wanted, (and as Homer sayth) there was no talke of buying nor selling, for the price and estimation of profite that grew by the customable encrease of cõtracting & bargayning was not yet knowẽ to them: but after they had entred the entrayles of the earth, and broken vp the bowels of their first mother, and that this thrice mischieuous, insaciable, execrable, and grædie famine of Golde and Siluer had assaulted and vanquished the harts of men, straight way was found the glutted gaine of practise by trafficke, that exchaunge, permutation, & election, had no more place among them: for there was nothing so worthie, holy, godly, or religious, that coulde then saue it selfe from the deuouring hurlepitte of grædie gayners.

The other part of Justice legall, is Distributiue, so called, for that it consisteth in distributing of honors, dignities, magistrateships, personages, offices benefices, immunities, exemptions, priuileges, franchises, and liberties, and of all other profits bestowed on persons worthie and well deseruing in publike causes: and also, the institution howe such people shoulde gouerne and beare them-

selues in these estates and dignities. The which Distributiue, for that it is no other thā the rewarde of vertue, I estœme to be worthie so great commendation and prayse, as nothing more, and therefore at this time wil touche it no further, but repose my selfe on that whiche the noble Orator Demosthenes hath sayde, in the Oration he made of Immunitie agaynst Leptinus, (who would haue disanulled and taken it away:) where he hath so sagely and profoundly set it out, and with such wise and graue modestie shewed howe we shoulde recompence and regarde worthie persons and well deseruers. And I among the rest of the opinions, doe best allow of this: for it is (sayeth he) a most fayre and commendable thing, not by flatterie or fraud, nor by reproch and tyrannie: but rightly and iustly, with our companions, familiars and like, in the lawes and the Citie, to shewe our selues among others to haue deserued some dignitie: which estimation and credit if you take away, take also away your Common wealth, for so will it be without gouerners & gouernment. Thus haue you of the lawes Ciuill and Legall iustice, so much as serueth to our purpose.

Of

Of morall Iustice.

OUr iustice, wherby we must attaine to our vertue, that is to say, to be welcome and well liked euery where, accounted wise, and good liuers, according to the maner of the Court, is much otherwyse than the same we haue yet spoken of: as in some places, alowing more liberty, & in some other more strictnesse and scrupulousnesse. And for ỹ it doth extende further than the other vertues (as we haue saide afore) so much is it the harder to shewe and name hir extremities: wherin I can say no more, but affirm that whatsoeuer is not done according to our vertue, how, in what sort, or whose act soeuer it be, is no other than manifest wrong and iniurie. And to speake of Commutatiue, as concerning contractes & bargayning one with an other: this must euer be the principle or maxime, that we ought not to abuse or wrong any: yet by this is to be vnderstanded if the iniurie be not couered, or hild with some shew, or likelihood of reason (for we are not accustomed to consider of causes so neare) as what he is, or whether he be honest or no, that taketh away or withholdeth the goodes of an other: For it is not onelye sufferable in bargaynyng, in buying, and sellyng, for

euerie

euery man to make his most profite, be it by fraude or otherwise, but also verie commendable. For (the Lawyers say) *Licet contrabentibus, inuicem se decipere.* It is lawfull in buyers, sellers, and marchantes, one to deceyue the other. Is not that man worthie then to bee noted an Idiot, and to be banished a common wealth, who hath apt occasion to deceyue or beguile his companion and mate by any honest meane, and will not do it? he learneth it not by our Philosophie, nor by the Court. We holde this generally as a great argument of our vertue: that it is tollerable to beguile, filch, and cogge, and do the worst we can, so that neither lawe, Iudge, nor iustice may touch or catch holde of vs for it. *Nemini enim facit iniuriam, qui suo iure vtitur.* He that makes the best of his owne, and mainteynes his owne right, doth wrong to none. And this pretext to maintaine our owne right, we giue as a licence to do all things: wherein those that are most subtile, craftie and ouer-reaching, are the best allowed and most esteemed of. Of whom it is sayde, if they owe any thing they will pay it, and if any owe them, they will likewise looke to be well payed. And touching stripes, contentions and offences: they are accustomed with this distinction to

be

be defined. Such as blade out their brawles manfully by armes, (whatsoeuer they be, or the cause they fight for) are not only to be excused, but rather to be commended: for commonly those that mainteyne their matters by the sworde, either defend their persons, or their honour, or they are prouoked and constreyned vnto it, so that they haue euer suche pretectes, or likely cloakes, vnder which the truth of their faultes and contentions lyeth hidden, and is couched so cunningly, that wee see them not: also we neuer regarde but the superficial part of any thing, and that which sheweth it selfe vnto vs. As for other offences, as robberies, ciuil iniuries, and such like priuate faultes, they are much more reproued & condemned than the rest, for that they haue not these foresayde cloakes and ordinarie shadowes, without the which, all crymes and offentes are more damnable, by oure Philosophie, than by the lawes: For Philosophers euer desired a iustice more strict, and a life more iust, than the Lawes do: likewise Gentlemen, Courtiers, and others of the Court, are not content with a prescribed life, according to the Ciuill lawe: But they will yet adde thereto more. For an euill doer or guiltie persone, at the least fault that hee commit-

committeth, toucheth the honour of him that is offended, which is in these dayes the most odious and hatefullest offence that may bee. For none can so slenderly harme or burte the honour of a Gentleman or Courtier, but the combate must straite be chalenged for want of further proufe, so that for giuing of one lie, it is permitted lawfull and iust to kill a man: for the reproufe of vanitie, and the lye, is the greatest scarre and mayme, that they maye giue to oure honour. Whereby it appeares what estimation wt haue of our honour: seeing we are allowed as well to defende oure honour, as the auncientes and lawes themselues haue allowed vs to defend our lyues, and not without reason: for honor and reputation is the finall conclusion of our vertue, without the whiche our vertue were of no value. All other offences therefore are lightlyer regarded of vs, than of the Lawes, by reason of their cunning couerynges, and pretie pretertes, whereof I haue spoken afore: except our reputation be touched, for in that cryme wee are nearer greeued than at any other, wherein I muste needes say the Lawes haue beene too fauourable. For to knowe what things they are that doe staine our honour, they may better bee thought off

than

than spoken: yet I will say thus muche before I passe any further, that touching loyaltie in woorde, or humanitie in deede towarde oure equalles or inferiours, it is nothing so requisite in our iustice as in the Auncientes, whereupon they made theyr fyrst and firme foundation: for it sufficeth vs to holde and kepe oure woorde so farre as the Iudge and Lawe may compell vs to performe it. But to promise without the compasse and daunger of action, is no other than a brauerie, in well promising: whereunto is applyed the common Prouerbe, that the promise of a Gentleman is holy water of the Court.

Of the seconde part of Iustice which is Distributiue, and of Liberalitie.

THe other part of our Iustice is Distributiue, which Cicero properly calleth liberalitie, (and reason good:) for what else is liberalitie, than the bestowing & distributing of honors and goods to well deseruing persons? wherin the auncients did flourish, & made famous their cõmon Weales: & surely in these days, I know no vertue so agreeable to our Philosophie, as this same. For (as I haue

haue often sayde) the summe of our science, and ende of our vertue hir selfe, is the glorie and reputation of anye man: and he which desireth it, and seeketh it, is worthily accounted wise, but he that hath it may be renowmed the happyest man in this worlde, who shal likewise liue for euer here in this world. On the contrarie, they that are careless, and account not what is sayde of them, are to be thought eyther blockish or careless. Pithagoras letter could not in these dayes helpe vs to this happinesse: neyther nædes Seneca now to breake our braynes any more with this song,

Illi mors grauis incubat,
Qui notus nimis omnibus,
Ignotus moritur sibi.

VVhom all men tooto well doe know,
a heauie ende he makes:
Himselfe yet to himselfe vnknowne
this present life forsakes.

For if we be not famous and knowne, wee cannot attain to the perfection of our vertue: as Claudian sheweth in his Countrie discourse, and this gallant Ouid, that became so wise, after he had receyued correction.

Crede mihi, bene qui latuit, bene vixit, & intra
Fortunam debet quisque manere suam.

Be-
leeue

Beleeue me who ſo liues within
his reach, he liueth well:
For eche man ought within the bondes
of his owne hap to dwell.

And further.

Viue ſine inuidia, moleſque inglorius annos
Exige, amicitias & tibi iunge pares.
Seeke life that enuie lackes
Mixt laudleſſe life with pleaſant yeeres,
No friendſhip ioyne with lackes,
Yet friendſhip frame, but with thy peeres.

I leaue therfore this to thoſe that are ſo deeply plunged in wiſedome, who agree all with one cõmon voyce, ſaying that they are moſt ſage and wiſe, which ſhew themſelues moſt meeke and humble: for it is directly repugnant and contrarye to oure Courtly vertue. Then ſince honour is the marke whereat we all ſhoulde tende our deſire: is there any readier meane to good reputation, than by liberalitie to deſtribute oure treaſure to all the worlde: to ſhewe pleaſure to all that come: to be fauourable and curteous to euery one: to reſcue ſome from the Prouoſt and Marſhals, & to free others from being Galliſlaues: & to keep & feed vp or vp. poore knaues as rauening as woolues: to make feaſts, triumphes, & bankets with open houſe? no truly.

Of liberalitie.

THis vertue consisteth in the distributing of three things in tẽporall goods, and this belongeth to great Lords. In reuerences and honor, and that is the duetie of inferiour companions: and in spirituall gifts, which is the office of those that are learned. As touching ẏ first, the principle which we ought to regarde, is to vse no liberalitie, but to such as deserue it: by whose meanes wee may bee accounted Philosophers of the Court, and worthie of this reputation: To good souldiours and men of warre that know their obedience to their Capitaine (and to such as I haue spoken of afore) braue Gentlemen, gallant, curteous and ciuil, that haue their hand neuer frõ their Cap, and one knee on the grounde, so seruiceable, so obedient, with a thousande courtesies, and as manys reuerences: such are worthie the liberalitie of Princes: And not those churlish repyners, vnto whom when you haue giuen the one halfe of your goodes, they will thinke styll you are beholden vnto them, and by circumstaunce refuse youre courtesie, to confirme the more their glowming gramitie: and as for receyuing any honour or reuerence of them

them, it is as muche as nothing: yet will they not sticke to malaperly to checke you, and say you liue euill, and will speake to you as to theyr seruaunts. To be beneficiall or doe good to these surly sort, is euill done, and is an extremitie of our vertue: which wee call prodigalitie, whereof wee maye saye with the good Ennius, *Benefacta male locata, male facta arbitror*. A good turne euill bestowed, is euill imployed: or a pleasure done to one vnworthie, is a hatefull vice.

The other *maxime* of our vertue is, to measure liberalitie according to oure facultie or abilitye: For none ought to gyue so muche, as hee bee compelled to begge himselfe after: yet there are some of sundrye opinions, that saye without respecte or regarde of goodes and worldlye wealth, wee shoulde not locke vp oure liberalitie, for they goe and come and increase dayly, and that it is better to be poore wyth honour and estimation, than riche wyth villanye and reproufe: But I am not of theyr opinion. For the Auncientes wouloe not, that in pleasuring of anye, wee shoulde so vnable oure owne state, that wee should take away the meane and benefit from ourselues, to be able to be friendly still: we must then gouerne

our bounty in such sort, as he doth which sheweth the way to a straunger, or he that lighteth an other mans candell at his: for the teacher loseth not his knowledge, nor the candel his clearnesse: and I thinke the graueſt & wiſeſt sort of our Philosophers, wil soneſt agrée with me in this. And further, he that is falne in decay, although by the same he haue deserued honor, & is estéemed liberal: yet will it be hard for him in his pouertie, to continue that credite, and maintayne that reputation: for we ordinarily disdayne the poore, and those that be in neceſſitie.

Our thirde *Maxime* is to ioyne liberalitie with iuſtice: for it is neither good, cõmendable nor decent, to be bountifull of that belongs to others, and (as they say) of an other mans leather to cut large thongs: wherein wæ muſt conſider of that wæ haue spoken of Iuſtice, that to withholde, or violently to kæpe anye mans goodes from hym, is no other then a gentle brauerie, so that the same bæ cloaked and couered wyth some likelyhode of reaſon. For (as we haue oft sayd afore) the semblances and appa rau nces of all things cunningly couched, are the principall supporters of oure Philoſophie: for suche as wæ sæme, suche are wæ iudged

here:

here: for by shiftes and some charge we may peruert iudgements and informations with cunning conueyance, but this is straunge to such as haue not felt the sweetenesse thereof, for we kepe this geare close in our budgets.

Also we ought to regarde, that in the vse of liberalitie eyther wee doe the first pleasure, or we acquit such good turnes and pleasures as we haue before receyued: wherein when we render and restore, we must not in any wise shew our selues niggards, nere and sparing: for those obligations of thankfulnesse are no lesse with vs, than if it were in a Ciuill cause. This is a great Argument to be obserued that where wee are liberall, it shoulde bee done so voluntarily, and with so francke a minde, as the name it selfe importeth: hauing regarde to consider the conclusion of euerie Diuision, to the ende the better to vse our vertue: what wee are, how able wee are, and what they bee vppon whom wee bestowe anye bountie or pleasure: eyther oure Parent, Neighbour, familiar or friend, or any other such lyke. In all the Circumstaunces there is one preterued poynt, that seemes of so greate efficacie, as it were a perfite and good loue grounded on vertue: whiche wee see to be finely flouri-

shed in Gentlemen to Gentlemen, and souldiers to souldiers, when they are all Courtiers, or of our Courtly crew, wherein it is not needfull nearely to regarde or search the occasiõ, & causes of such friendship or friendly amitie. For it sufficeth that vpon this foũdation of honestie, and Courtly ciuilitie, there be certaine shadowed graces and countenances of weake loue, and faint fauour: whiche may well be called (if the terme were tollerable) a fawning flatterie, that tyeth them together with mutuall curtesie.

Of the two other partes of Liberalitie.

THe other two partes of our liberalities consist in distributing, and bestowing of Duetics, Honours, and Reuerences: whiche belongs to inferiour followers, and to the good felowship of Courtly companions. And as for gyuing of aduice and counsell, that belongs to the learned and lettered men, be they superiours, equalles, or inferiours. Touching the first, they must carefully regarde that they be not sparing, slacke or negligent, in lowe lowting, and humblie reuerencing suche as deserue it; For then men might

might call them eyther arrogant, proude, or ignorant: neyther must they be prodigall to euery man with their salutations, in words or deedes: for so they may be accounted deepe dissemblers, flatterers, or very simple soules. As for ỹ lerned, they should haue care, & partly enforce themselues to giue counsell to others: yet not alwayes with the truth, but according to the appetite, and pleasure of those, they speake and giue aduice vnto: for if they bolde, follow, and affyrme their owne iudgementes and opinions, howe true and good so euer they bee, they shall be called obstinate fooles & wilfull headstrong: & so they can neuer come to the perfectiõ of our vertue This is very much vsed in consulting with Lawyers of our right, whs cõmonly frame their councell according to the humor of the partie whõ they counsell. This is not onely vsed at these dayes, but in times past Cicero did ỹ same in his pleadings, as himselfe doth witnesse, in his oration for Plancus. *In causis* (sayth he) *adhibemur, vt ea dicamus, non quæ nostra auctoritate constituantur, sed quæ ex reipsa causaq; ducantur.* They will haue vs in pleading, not to say at all times what seemes to vs good: but to speake that only which serueth ỹ time, place, and persons belonging to our purpose.

And furthermore: *Non solùm meo consilio vti consueui, sed multum etiam eius, quem defendo, & consilio & voluntati obtempero.* I haue not (sayth he) beene accustomed to doe all after my owne head or iudgement, but rather applied my selfe to the counsell, will, and opinion of my client. I see none please mee more in this respect, than holye mother Churche men: and not without cause, for moste of them take great payne to attayne to oure vertue. And it shoulde seeme greate iniurie to learning, if the ignorannt and vnlettered shoulde haue this vertue, to restrayne theyr affections, to frame and accommodate themselues to the qualitie and condition of those they talke to, better than the learned: much lyke the nedie Norman, that procured him selfe a Prebendshippe, and yet so ignorannt for learning, as hee could not reade: kept his Hymnes, Houres, and tymes of Seruice with the best: who when a friende of hys saw him chaunting in the Chauncel, & knew his ignorance, asked him how he prayed, and what he sayd: I haue (quoth he) learned the Alphabet or xxiij. letters, whereof all prayers are made, and them I dayly and wholy deliuer in my singing and saying to God, who I knowe may make what prayers he will

will of them: But for the ignorant, we will speake more when we write of modesty. And that whiche wee haue sayde of the liberall in their temporall goods, may serue well for example to the Clergy, in their spiritual deuotions. Therefore it is nedeles to recyte it any more. And nowe to the two extremities of this our vertue.

Prodigalitie and Couetousnesse.

THe distributing of goods & magnificall expẽces, is towards vs so gracious, honest, and fauorable, that I know no way how to auoyde the feare of excesse in this vertue, whiche is prodigalitie. And on the other side, the auaricious nigarde and miser is so hatefull and reprochfull to all men: that to shunne and flye the euill opinion of the worlde, touching this vice, wee muste recoyle backe so farre, that wee become as it were somewhat prodigall. And if it bee tollerable to mingle golden gayne and profite of mony, with honestie (whiche the beste and wisest Philosophers past would not do) wee shall proue and finde the couetous and nigarde to lose more of their goods by their misery, than they keepe

or get by their wretched policye. Therefore whē we see a churle welthy or rich, we ought not to say that his auarice or nærencsse hath gathered it: For if hee were like liberall to vse it, as he is pining to preserue it, he should by the same (without cōparison) encrease his cofers with treble gayne. For as by his ouer muche care and diligence hee hath gotten it, so by his endlesse follye and feare to lose it, hee leaues to imploy it to his greter profite: As when hee sayeth,

Fertilior seges est alieno semper in aruo:
Vicinúmque pecus grandius vber habet.

The frute more fertile seemes, that growes
within my neyghbours grounde:
The vdder of my neighbours beaste,
with milke doth more abounde.

This is the couetouse cause, hee will buy no more lands nor beasts, but miserably hoyde and hyde his money in the grounde, or locke it vp for allurement to Theues. For euen as the ielouse feare of fonde and foolishe husbands, makes their wiues the more soughte vnto, shewing by their suspicion signe of some occasion, either ỳ she is willing, or ỳ she loues not hir husband, or else some other cause whiche makes and moues yong men to enter in assured hope of obtayning their desire:

desyre. So likewise, the pyning payne, and so nudging solitarinesse, whiche wee see the myser and couetous endure to keepe and garde his goods and treasure, wyth his head still in his cubbarde, and his nose euer in his coffer: stirres vp the hungrie theefe, and showes him, where plentye is to bee purchased by his pyking pollicie. Whereof it is commonly spoken: *Malus est custos diuturnitatis metus*, Hee that feareth, looseth. And Ouide writing to the ielious, whiche wetche their wiues so narowly, dothe properly say:

Quicquid seruatur, cupimus magis, ipsaq́ furem
Præda facit: quod sinit alter: amant.

The harder kept, the more is sought,
the price doth make eche thing a pray,
The thing that others way as nought,
who seekes? we wyshe not what we may.

For the better example of this, I maye alleadge the cunning varlet Strophilus in Plautus: who seeing the greate payne and toyle that the most vnfortunate Erilius had, in hiding his golde, carying it sometime into one place, and sometyme into another, fraughte with continuall feare leaste hee shoude bee spyed, supposing there was good to bee done, sought the cause, and fynding the money, robbed hym of it. Likewyse,

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the filth of this vice is such, that there is none which hateth not a nigarde, and are glad and desirous to doe him all the displeasure that may be: so that he lacketh the grace and good wil of others, wherby he might make a more profit. For (as Cicero sayeth) *Rerum omnium nec aptius quicquam est ad opes tuendas ac tenendas, quàm diligi, nec alienius quàm timere.* There is no meane more profitable to man to make him riche, and better to garde his goods, than to deserue the fauor and loue of euery one: nor any thing more contrary, than to haue fewe friends, and be in continuall feare. We reade amongest the Romanes of one named Mamercus, a riche man and of greate credit, who for that he did nothing magnifically or sumptuously, whilst hee was Edile, (according to their custome) fell into the slaunder and reproche of auarice and couetousnesse: for the which he was so euill beloued of the people, that after, hée following the dignitie of the Consulship, for this onely cause they refused him. And if we will consider from the beginning to our tyme, what estimation was ther euer had of a couetous man? what sayeth all the worlde of a miser? the villaine will not giue a glasse of wine to any of credit or honestie: or (as our prouerb is,) he will not parte

from

from the dropping of his nose: hée dare kéepe no companie for feare of spending: hée doth no good to himselfe, nor to any other: hée eateth his otes in his owne sacke: he neuer feedeth but in his bosome: & many other suche like hatefull reproches. In so muche, that there is no Gentleman, how noble-borne so euer hée bée, that is not reputed and accompted a villaine, if he giue at any time never so little occasion to be seene in any thing miserable or pinching. So that I rather allowe, and better agrée with them, who haue theyr hartes so noble, their mindes so franke, and their sprightes so glorious, that they will soner cõsume their goods in braueries, pomps, and magnificall expences, than to bée slaunderously touched with nigardnesse or miserie. Couetousnesse commonly is hated in all persons, but chéefely in Princes and greate Lords, to whome it is moste conuenient and séeming of all others, to exercise bountie and liberalitie, where otherwise, the continuall taking & receyuing of their right from their Subiectes, without giuing, dispersing, and distributing agayne, in processe of time they shall find themselues to haue neither tribute to receyue, nor subiect to pay it. For who cã better dispose of goods (whiche that noble

man

Plato would haue had cõmon) thã those that haue them? Howe shall men of vertue and valure, good companions, and small mates, come by any parte or porcion, if there be not bountifull giuers? following this opinion, some will say and mainteyne, that the riche & couetous are thæues, in making that pryuate & their proper owne, which shoulde bee common to all men. It is not then without cause, that this vice is so much hated of vs, & banished from our cõpany, wherein there is nothing so displeasant, as not to be glad and willing to doe pleasure. And therefore, howe much the infamy of it is greate, so much the rather should we withdraw we our selues, and shunne the chaunce of such extremities, euẽ with ỹ losse of our goods, or rather (as I haue sayd) to be reputed prodigall. For ỹ prodigall are more excusable, without cõparisõ, in our vertue, then ỹ couetous. And if we will well consider of it, we shall finde none so prodigall (& therfore the more reprouable) as the auaricious. For what may be greater prodigalitie, than to gather togither, and laye vp the goods of this commonaltie: and to take away from a cõmon wealth the faculty to vse it, & by that meane to lose it, and (as it is sayde) cast it into the Sea? for if the goods of a my-

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ser bée not losse from the profiting of a com-mõ wealth, at the least for his lyfe, I cannot tell what may bæ accompted more lost. For bæ pleasureth his friendes, and benefiteth himselfe as much with that he hath, as with that he hath not, and his riches are to him as to others, no riches at all. Wherby it is spo-ken: *Tam deest auaro quod habet, quàm quod non habet*: The auaricious hath no lesse neede of that he hath, than of that he hath not. Then if his goods serue to no purpose, neyther to himselfe, nor in the fellowshippe of men: we musse accompt it losse, and bæing losse, wée may clærelie perceyue, that the auaricious and miser, is the true and perfite prodigall. But to the end we will not seeme to allowe vnmeasurable expẽces, we will giue boũds, confines, and limits to liberalitie. Cicero in his offices sayth, We ought not to gyue any thing, except it be either profitable or neces-sarie. So that profit and necessity be the two hounds of this vertue, which ouerpassed any way, we become presẽtly prodigall. But tru-ly if we should thus strictly cõprehend all, we shal make most part of our courtiers, & ỹ best praised, wilfull wasters, whõ we notwith-stãdingesteeme very wise. For not only those which cõsume their welth, or make sõtimes

magnificent

magnificencie without profite, cause, or necessitie, are not alone pronounced prodigall: But this vnquencheable heate, and vnsatiable desire of glory, the whiche without all iudgemente and consideration constraynes them to doe it, is honest, and commeth of so good a nature, that there is attributed vnto them, a vertue more greate than liberalitie, which is called Magnificencie, wherof comes this tytle so excellent of magnicall. And moste truelye when the intention and good wyll of any person dothe fynde and fele that whiche hee dothe good or euill, suche magnificencie is muche to bee praysed, proceeding from so greate a loue of oure vertue, and from suche affection to pleasure others, that they haue no leysure to thinke of nor consyder all the maximes and circumstances, the whiche scrupulouslye the Auncientes woulde haue vs obserue and keepe in this liberalitie. And further, wee that doe long looke or muche muse on things secrete and hydden, but regarding the superficiall parte and the outwarde appearance of theyr deedes, seing that by suche magnificencie they shewe them selues of minde the liberallest that maye bee: not considering the vtilitye, profite,

profite, or necessitie, cunningly couched, and well covered ouer: howe can we but iudge of such people all good and all honor? leaue we thē that same Valerie the great talker of liberalitie, when he sayth, that the two fountains from whence she cōmes, is true iudgemente and honest good will: for the ardent affection and hote desire to be praysed of all men, can not discerne this, nor will not be so scrupulous, to consider of circumstances so farre off. Let vs compare in semblable cases, the mutuall loue betwēn the father and his childrē, and we shall sée sometime the feruencie therof to be so great, that without consideration (meaning them well,) they doe marre and spoyle them, not hauing their iudgement certaine by reason of this ouermuch affection, to discerne what is good or euill for them. Is such loue and friendship to be blamed with vs? Is it not true affection? yes verely, although some others call it a cockering: So that if any will nearer regard the profit of the one or the other, if this amitie do not earnestly appeare therein, it can not be perfit. Euen so let vs iudge of the magnificall man, who if he should consider with himselfe, how profitable it were for him to do that he determineth: would they not say, his deliberation

smelt of miseries: and how he had great ware to lose that he meant to lay out? It is not at this time only, or in these dayes, that our vertue hath bin so measured. For do not the noble & ancient Romains glorie to be attributed magnificall? Was it needfull or profitable, to cut mountaines, and to make of them in the sea a fyrme lande? Was it requisit euerie morning to all that came & sayd, good morow my Lorde, to giue and distribute such great summes of money as they did? whereof Iuuenall doth well report. What should I speake particularly of Pompe, of the Theaters, the Triumphant Gates and Temples that he builded? Is not the magnificencie of Lucullus knowne by his sumptuous gardens and galleries? For this cause onely we haue them as a president of perpetuall memorie, and there is none of our Philosophers that doth not with great diligence endeuer hym self to imitate and followe them, chiefly in their Antiquities. The honour of the Romaines was so great for their haught courages and magnificall myndes: as all *Italie* is yet proud of it. And if we maye after them speake of oure selues, shall we not fynde among vs in our tyme, some whose sumptuous expenses haue gayned them great fame? Let vs con-

consider of the noble doctors and professed masters in our Philosophie, whom we haue before our eyes for example, whom we must followe and allowe in all, whose authoritie ought to satisfie vs for reason, as well as that same of Pithagoras did satisfie hys Disciples: he sayde it euen so of these: they haue done it, it ought not to be argued or doubted, whether it be well or seemely done. We muste vnderstande that in their liberalities, they manye times consider not what is moste meete, profitable, or necessarie, but that their magnificencie maye be the more extolled. And notwithstanding that suche sumptuousnesse are not euer good; commendable, and according to vertue: yet haue they great reason so to doe. For (as Theophrastes sayethe in hys booke of Ryches) suche magnificalnesse, is the profite and reuenewe, that we receyue of the goodes we haue, without the whiche (the necessitie to lyue excepted) I estæme and allowe as well of pouertye as of ryches. Notwithstanding, I knowe verye well, that Cicero, in hys seconde Booke of Offices, lyked not of it: nor Aristotle, who derydinge vs, for that we wonder to heare howe that in the warres, sometymes in a besyeged Towne or

Citie, we will giue a testerne for a small ves-
sell of water, and consider not that without
necessitie (hauing both body and mynde at li-
bertie) we account not to consume muche
money for nothing. So euery one hath his
owne opinion, and they be not altogither al-
lowed and approued of vs: for there is not so
meane a Courtier that delightes not to make
some idle expences, to the end to appear ma-
gnificall. And whereas in loue matters, eue-
ry one principally endeuers him self to seeme
wyse, ciuil, and best worthy, and such we will
here take him. Let vs imagine the represen-
ting of two Louers of some continuance be-
fore vs, and consider among all others, tou-
ching this our vertue, how they gouerne and
behaue them selues. We shall see the yong
gallant, that (without any consideration of
profit or necessitie) can not finde robes rich y-
nough, nor sufficient sumptuous apparell for
to prancke himselfe withall: neither rings
newe made, or iewels new fashioned for his
mistres: nor daintie meates exquisit and de-
licate inough to bancket hir. And she for hir
part, in euery poynt indeuers hir selfe to do
the same. And though peraduenture neither
the one nor the other can accomplishe their
whole desire, for their poore purse ruthfully
repleni-

plenished: yet they will so do, that their talk shall not taste or smell of any thing but all of magnificalnesse, for in this vertue consisteth their honor or dignitie. I remember me of yong Clitipho in Terence who had a sumptuous lover and of a haughtie heart, and coulde not wring from his father, being olde, couetous, and hard, sufficient money to furnishe hir, vsed priuatly to cõplaine, & would oft debate alone, howe he should gouerne with credit, the countenannce of his loue, concluded thus in himselfe, saying: *Nihil esse mihi, religio est dicere.* I make it (saith he) conscience to tell hir that I haue nothing for hir. Whereby we may see, howe vnwilling he was to seeme couetous or needie, and yet had no meane to shewe himself magnificall: so muche is this vertue commendable. The olde myserable lover in the Comedie of Intronati, did not so, for he was bountifull in perfuming his gray beard, when he was at the cost to bestow a penyworth of Cenit, to besmeere himselfe withall: But God knowes howe his Marlet mocked and laughed at him. And as Ouid, writing to a couetous damsell, shewing hir howe he could no longer loue hir, for that she was subiecte to gayne and luker, sayth:

Turpe thori reditu census augere paterno,
Et faciem lucro prostituisse suum.

With beastly gayne begot in bed,
To enlarge the Dowre thy daddie gaue,
And set thy face with curled hed,
To shewe and sale to euery slaue.

Hereby you may perfectly perceyue, what vigour or force there is in liberalitie and magnificencie, to winne the grace and fauour of euery body: yet I knowe there are mercinarie mynions, which make no little luker of their lecherie: but this must not be thought to be loue, that is thus lodged in their lasciuious heartes. It is not euill seeming to a woman to receyue gyftes of hir louer, though it be ill seeming for hir to demaund: as their good Master Ouid declareth.

Nec dare, sed pretium poscere dedignor, & odi.

It offendeth me not (sayth he) to giue, but it greeueth me when they aske, and that mislikes me most. Was Lays of *Corinth*, eyther wise or of good grace, to demaunde so many Crounes of Demosthenes? he allowed of it so well, that he would not after heare hir speake, nor giue him selfe to great occasion of repentance. Notwithstanding the danger

ger is greate, (and especially to persons of noble myndes, and affected to our Philosophie,) that the Lawes ought haue prouided for it: Considering that it is a great interest to the common weale, to haue many poore and needie Citizens: and that the ryches of the Prince, consisteth not so much in his coffers, as in the ryches of hys subiectes, they would that he who is seene or supposed to gouerne hym selfe riottously, or to lyue so disorderly as he myghte thereby after become needie, shoude haue an ouerseer, and not accordingly or indistinctly of hym ỹ magnifically makes vnprofitable expences: for if it were so, there would not be found in all Fraunce ouerseers sufficient. Thus wee ought to vnderstande this sentence, *Interest Reipub. ne quis re sua male vtatur.* It behoues the common weale to see, that none applye his goodes euill. For we muste thinke that otherwise the Lawes or Princes woulde forbid these magnifycall expences, as euill of it selfe, and not according to vertue.

Euen as one named Marcus Opius made a Law, that the Romane Ladies should vse no superfluous apparel, nor wear at their eares any Ryng or Gemme of gold, weying more than an ounce, as recyteth Pomponius Letus,

of the lawes of Rome: this lawe was made for feare the Romanes had, least by such sundry ornamentes their wiues should become lasciuious. It may be also considered, of that the Emperoure Iustinian did forbid to some sort of persons, that they shoulde not weare certaine coloured and wrought clothes: As of late, the french king prohibited gentlewomē and Citizens wiues from wearing certaine ornamentes and attire of golde (the whiche the Dames of *Lions* did much murmure and grudge at) and all is but for the causes before mencioned: for order & pollicie in the distinction and difference of apparell, according to the maiestie and qualitie of the person, is of great authoritie and force.

Of Magnanimitie.

WE are nowe mounted very highe, and attained near to the throne where our vertue is seated: and for that she hath reposed hir self in a place hard to come to, according to this good sentence of Isocrates: *Virtutis radix amara, fructus vero dulces*: The roote of Vertue is bitter, but the fruites are sweete and good: therefore is it, that the nearer we approch vnto hir, the more euill, vntoward and sharp,

sharpe do we finde the way, vntil we obtaine the perfit place it selfe: which when we haue wonne, nothing will be hard and wearisome vnto vs. I say this, meaning to speak of magnanimitie, which is the same that makes vs so strong & assured, that nothing in the world (be it neuer so difficile or difficate,) can force or driue our mindes to declyne from the way of vertue. It is not then without cause called Magnanimitie, and those that professe it and embrace it magnificall: which is to say, of a noble, bountifull, and honorable hart: For what greater excellencie can the spirite possesse or enioye, than to be still accompanied with conditions most like it selfe. And for any accident, inconuenience, or misfortune that shall happen, not to be troubled or vnquieted, but so to remayne and abyde euer firme and constant? One great argument of the precious value of this vertue is, that amongst all other things which are common as well to man as to woman, this is only made proper and incident to men, and contrariwise, fickleneese and inconstancie to women: Of the which cõmon opinion many men are proud, and so content, that for this cause alone they suppose the better of themselues, and will be accounted wise: disdayning and contemning

to beare the argumente of a woman, as though she were a brutishe and vnreasonable creature: condemning their sundrie follies, as subduers and banquishers of reason in themselues, when such defectes of nature be in both the one and the other. The daughter of Hortensius a Romaine Orator, hath by hir singular vertues well proued, that women are capable of reason: Holde be it, that by meane of a naturall weakenesse, which is fashioned in them for want of instructions and doctrines, they haue not the vse of it so familiarly. Man challenging magnanimitie then as proper to himselfe shoulde we not estæme it a great iniurie, that he should be so delicate, effeminate, variable, and inconstant? If we shoulde see a man marche through the streate at none dayes, in the habites and attire of a woman, woulde not the world mocke him? And yet to knowe a man, without the same outward shew and appearance to be a woman in dæde, as was Hermaphrodites, there is nothing sayde of hym. Wherfore do we reproue Hercules, when he shrouded himselfe among handmaydes, but onely for that he left his manly courage, and yelded to womanly weakenesse: with the which attire, he could neuer frame himselfe

to any thing or other purpose, but to beare the disgrace? It is not possible for those, who haue their spirites weake and feeble in following this vertue, to attaine good renowme, or doe any valiaunt acte of valure, what countenance or brauerie so euer they make. This is the answere that Helen made to Paris, when he perswaded hir to go to *Troy* with him, and to feare nothing, vaunting him selfe to be the valiantest and noblest warriour in the worlde. She seeing him so lapt and linckt in loue, and enchaunted so farre from that he would seeme or professed, that he had no more the countenaunce of a man, say de to him:

Quod bene te iactes, & fortia facta recenses,
a verbis facies dissidet ista tuis,
Aptа magis Veneri, quam sunt tua corpora Martis,
bella gerant alij, tu Pari semper ama.

For that in brauerie you your maritall deeds recyte,
The truth is thus, that from your wordes your features differs quite,
For Venus fitter then, than Mars doth seeme to be:
Loue Paris, and let men of force, go fight in fielde for thee.

I would gladly eſteeme and regarde loue, if it were not the ground and cauſe of all this euill, and that it woulde not force and conſtraine the courage of man, to ſerue and become vaſſall to feminine fragilitie: or would prayſe greatly women, if they loued more, and delighted more in the vertues of theyr friendes and louers, rather than in a ſorte of counterfet curioſities. But the doctrine of this great Courtiſane in his Art of loue can not lie: *Parua leues capiunt animos*: Houering myndes haue no hold, and light ſpirites are beſt pleaſed with trifling follies. There is nothing more vndecent or vnfitting to a man, than to be no man. I knowe notwithſtanding, our Philoſophie, and that good grace whereof we will ſpeake hereafter, will not ſuffer vs that among women we ſhoulde be ſtill Platons: nor likewiſe haue vs in euery place to gouern our ſelues, as it were ſtill in the companie of women. The conſiderations of the circumſtances, as of the time, the place, the perſons, and others (which is proper to prudence) will keepe vs from this euill, wherein it is neceſſarie to haue this good grace. And the larglier to treate of this kynde, to the ende more clearely to ſhewe what ſhe is: we muſt repeate the ſame ſo oft ſpoken of afore, that the

end

end of all our Philosophie and vertue (that is to liue according to the manner of the Court) is honour and good reputation: without the which, I see nothing that should so much stir or prouoke vs to great trauell, and so tormẽt vs in this world, as that. For (as Cicero saith which was not still Academicus) *Nullam aliam periculorum & laborum mercedem virtus desiderat, quàm laudis & gloriæ: qua detractata, quid est, quod in hoc breuissimo vitæ curriculo tam miserè nos exerceamus?* Vertue will haue no other recompence for hir paines and dangers, than praise and honor, without the which why should we endeuer so great trauell, in this short and fleeting time of our most wretched and vnhappie life? Leaue therefore such as speake otherwise of Vertue. Seeing honor then is the butte and marke wherunto the Sages tended their desire, and the only cause that makes man happy, should we not cõtemne all, neglect, despise, & forsake all other things to come to this? Yes truely. Beholde here the definition of our Magnanimitie to do good to parent or friende, further than the same is honorable vnto vs. And to feare no daunger be it neuer so greate, that shoulde hinder any actions, whereby it maye attaine to this perfection. By this I meane not, that no payne should be takẽ to get goods,

or

or that we should not vse our pleasure, or reuerence our parents, entertaine our friends: loue God, and hate the Diuell: But I saye and affirme, that if any of these be to hinder or lesse our honour, we shoulde leaue them and not regarde them: for that man is not magnificall that preferreth the slender pleasure of suche small tryfling thyngs, to the great value and ryches of honour. In this the Romaines excelled, whose haughtie heartes and lofte courages so muche imprinted this vertue in the myndes and spyrites of all the Countrie, that yet to this daye to theyr posteritie it is a great pleasure and glorye, as it maye easilye be iudged by theyr countenaunces, that smelleth still of libertie, a contemning of all thinges, a desyre to atchieue vertuous actes, and an vncredible patience. There is no iudgemente of the affections and inwarde dispositions of anye, more certayne than by the outwarde countenaunce and open shewe of oure lyuing. For as it is sayde, *Abeunt studia in mores*: Oure studies and affections are transformed into manners. Whereof commeth oure ordinarie graces, gestures, and countenaunces, whyche is easylye sene and knowne in

in all oure actes. And thoughe particularly euerye one dothe enforce hym selfe to dissemble and disguise hys proper affections, as muche for the ignorannce of those he is conuersaunt wyth, as sometymes for hys owne imperfections whyche he woulde haue secrete or hid (wherein principallye consisteth a good grace, as we wyll shewe hereafter) notwythstanding this dissimulation is no practyse of the affections and opynions, common to anye one Nation, Prouince, or Countrey, or to anye one certayne state of persons what so euer. For suche affections causeth in vs one certayne manner of doynges (as I haue sayde) by the whiche commonlye euerye one in hys countenaunce will be knowne what he is, and from whence he is. Whereby we maye well discerne the Italyan, the Frenche man, and the Almayne, one from the other, and by theyr gestures and countenaunces onely.

And for as muche as suche opynions and manners of lyuing generally, are the more harde to be taken from vs, beeing so deepe rooted in vs by continuaunce, as they are turned into nature: So muche the

more

more ought they to be estæmed, that according to the exigent of euery cause, for their honor or profite, can seeme to be of any other nation, estate or condition than they are. The which we dayly sæ do attaine great reputation, and atchieue their enterprizes worthyly: as maye perfectly be perceiued, in those that are spyes in the wars, an example meete and sufficient for this purpose, though they in the execution be not regarded nor estæmed as they ought. On the contrarie, the most part of people, albeit they haue the wisdome to knowe where and when to dissemble, and that they are so magnificall and modest, as they thinke to do well: yet are they masked in so many follies and fond loue of their cõtries, and are in so great a gealosy of their doings, that notwithstanding any honor, reputation, or profite, might happen them by this dissimulation, they wil still be like thẽselues: estæming it a great offence, to vse any fashion not in custome among them, for feare to be iudged of any other nation than they are: And will be offended, if by them the stranger knowe not the vices and imperfections of his countrie. But to returne to our purpose, the Romaines haue so flourished in this vertue, that they estæmed nothing for euill but dishonor:

nor: and regarded nothing for good, but honor & reputation. And although there were many Philosophers that spake otherwise of this vertue than we doe, saying that goodnesse & honestie consisteth elsewhere, which we alow not: let them know that the most part are with vs, and of ours, affirming the onely bountie & vertue hir selfe to bee in the good reputation of men: for the whiche the greatest paynes, trauelles, and tormentes, were most delyghtfull pleasures vnto them. And not withoute cause. For if we haue care to keepe cleane, neate, and orderlye, oure outwarde bodie, regarding that it bee not bounde to any inconuenience: we should be muche more vigilante, to see that oure inwarde spright receyue no villanie touched with dishonor. Among all the remembred histories of noble and famous Ladies, I wyll speake but of one, named Lucrece, who to deface the little dishonor she had suffred by hir rauishment, killed hir selfe. What hart of a woman had she? was it not vertuously done in regard of hir honor, to leaue life, & despise death, nothing remēbring the will of God: who woulde not (as shee knewe, and as the world was thē of opinion) ỳ the soule should passe out of the bodie, without leaue of him

that placed it there: no more than a Souldier may departe from vnder his ensigne or oute of the Campe, without licence of his Captaine. It is not to be marueled at, if iellious iowles, and suspicious pates doe commonly gyue their wiues the picure of Lucrece killing hir selfe. For the example (as they suppose) may strongly and straungely moue them: and also their wiues themselues haue greate delight to behold the same.

We muste not forget one notable poynt, in this vertue: For Cicero in his firste booke of Offices sayeth, that commonlie haughty mindes and inuincible courages, fall into deepe desire of glory, and greedye affection of gouernmence, whereby they bee prouoked, stirred, and occasioned to doe euill: so as incontinent they leaue and forsake this vertue. For (as wee haue sayde afore) if thee become straunge, and contrarie to Iustice, shee is no better than vyce, boldnesse, and rashnesse: yet for that wee measure not Iustice so strictly as they haue done, so much the lesse we oughte, or neede to feare this consequente. And further, if the minde of man bee not loftye and glorious, hee shall very hardlye and with greate difficultie, become magnificall. For what is it that should

encourage

encourage vs to contemne so many things, and to bee strong and constante in induring all: if it were not the desire and hope of glorie, whiche is the onely ende of oure Philosophie: Also who is to bee founde so senseleſſe, blockishe, or voyde of reason, that hauing atchieued any valiant acte, or worthilye performed any notable enterprise, is not gladde and desyrous of renowmed prayse: The Gods be so ielous of theimselues, that they wyll and commaunde to be incessantly honored: As Ouid writeth to Cesar in his second booke *de Triſtibus*:

Fama Ioui ſupereſt, tamen hunc ſua facta referri,
Et ſe materiam carminis eſſe iuuat.

Aye lasting is the fame of Ioue,
and yet he doth delyght
To gyue the trumpe new matter still,
his prayses to recyte.

Cicero likewise thinking of himselfe, and applying vertue according to his affection, chaunged his opinion, and acknowledged the debte: as wee haue noted at the beginning of this worke. The desire of glory is so naturallye borne, and nourished within oure myndes, that wee maye well maintayne and approue, that this Philosophye is in some sorte grounded on

Nature, as well as the same of the auncy-entes. There is none, who haue occasion to be praysed for any excellencie, eyther by nature, accident, education, or industrie, that is not wylling and desirous to bee spoken of. It may bee aptlye seene in women, who although they bee naturally bashefull, shamefast, and modeste, and that they dare not so boldlye shewe their affections as men: yet they cannot so dissemble, but that they seeme gladde, and reioyce to bee called fayre, and for the same are not a lyttle glorious. As the Poet that knewe them so well, affirmes of them,

Fastus inest pulchris, sequitur & superbia formam.
Disdayne doth still depende
vpon dame beauties trayne,
And pride to hir alwayes
as handmayde doth remayne.

And after in his Arte of Loue:

Delectant etiam castas præconia formæ:
Virginibus curæ, gratáq; forma suaest.
The prayse of beautie vertuous maydes
doe like and loue full well:
They like the name, they loue the forme
wherein they doe excell.

This desire of glory notwithstanding should not be inordinate, for so might it blynde the iudgement

iudgemente in ſuche vayne ſorte, that the true vſe and knowledge of it woulde leaue vs: whereby it commonlye happeneth, that thoſe whiche are ſottes in dæde, and not glorioule, ſuppoſing to doe worthilye and honeſtlye, (whereof myght proceede a kynde of prayſe and glorye) doe it ſo fondlye, that they are as they deſerue, mocked of the people. And ſurelye I doe not a lyttle lamente, to ſæ this errour ſo common in all men. Therefore wæ deſcribe ſuche gallauntes by the glorious Souldiers, in the Poets Comedies, who were ſo meſhed in this kynde of follie, that they knewe neither what they ſayde, nor what they did. As he that vaunted the King coulde no way bee without him, howe he gouerned all, and that there was none but loued & reuerenced him, ſaying thus to his ſeruant:

Eſt iſtuc datum
Profecto mihi, grata ſint quæ facio omnia.

The Gods in byrth to me aſsignde
this glorious gyft from heauen aboue,
That all things yeelde vnto my minde,
my wordes and deedes all men approue.

And he yet more fole in Plautus, whome his malaparte ſquire made to beleeue that all women accompted him ſo fayre, as they ran

in euery place after him. The patche supposing it to be true, sayd: *Nimia est miseria pulchrũ esse hominẽ nimis.* It is (sayeth he) a greate paine to be an ouer fayre man. Hæreby wee perceiue ẏ to be glorious is not euill, so ẏ vse of it be not matched with folly. Cicero in his Offices sheweth, how the magnificall man should not be melãcholy or angry, & that magnanimitie doth principallie consist in ẏ brideling of this affection, for bicause (as hee affirmeth in his Tusculans) it troubleth & vexeth ẏ mind more thã any other passion. And Plutarche in his treatise of Tẽperance declareth ẏ those whiche are delicatlye nourished, are most subiect to ire & quarels, & sonest angry. The fury of this passion was well seene by Hecuba in *Eurypides*, and by Progne and Philomela in Ouids *Metamorphosis*. Notwithstanding this argument whatsoeuer it pleased them to say, we are of contrary opinion: that if anye Gentleman or Courtyer bee wronged, cheefly when the outcage toucheth his honor or reputation, and hee seeme not to take the matter in greate græfe, althoughe hee can dissemble, hee is not valiant nor magnificall. And those that moste furiouslye fume in any suche quarell, are men of most courage, and thoughte hawtyest of harte.

So

So that sundry are proude to say, I am cholericke of Nature, and accompt of this as a vertue.

Of Temperance.

The last fountaine from whence floweth the perfection of honestie, is that that giueth force and light to others, without whiche nothing can bee well done: And is called Temperance, whiche is a moderation of perturbations and troubles of the mynde, and a measurable mildnesse or meane in all things. Whereof I can particulie speake no more, but that it very neare comprehendeth all the reste, and is the principall spring from whence floweth all good behauiour. The modest man is hee that pleaseth euery man, who taketh nothing in malice or displeasure, and frames his quietnesse to all purposes. On the cõtrary, he that both arrogantlye impresse in his sprightes his first opinions and imaginations, & will not any way yeelde to reasonable chaunge, is hated of all men. And of him it is sayde: *Malum consilium quod mutari non potest*: The counsel of that man is euill, which may not bee altered. For although suche aduyce bee good and reasonable, yet it muste bee moderated,

& masked, according to the pleasure of others. These kind of people we shold not accõpany our selues with, as wilful men, hedstrõg, hasty, & suche as are subiect to their owne affections: for since eche one, hathe his proper imperfections, if wæ should still be obstinate or stoute, and would not yæld nor apply our selues one to another, nor suppozte and soth one the other, there shoulde bæ nothing but deuocion, contention, & particularity among men. Therfore is it most proper to Prudẽce, to know the persons, place, & time, with the rest of their circumstances. And this bæyng knowen, Temperance entreth our harts, & mollifieth all the parts of it, & cõstrayneth it not to talke euill, or be offended at any thing though the same be imperfect, in suche sorte, that partlye it dissembleth, and partlie it applyeth, and obeyeeth to all these circumstances. So wæ maye knowe, that those offenders are vexed with two vices, with Ignorance, and that is excusable when it is alone: and with naturall presumption, engendred and borne in our myndes, by this seconde Nature whereof wæ treate: whiche presumption doth hinder and let our mildenesse, and so maketh vs disdainfull, arrogant, and stubborne agaynste others, and

causeth

causeth our anger to be obstinate, furious, and spightfull in opinion. But this vertue expulseth these vices, and maketh our hartes mæke, lowly, hũble, & obedient. As touching those that offende but of ignorance, they are (as I haue sayde) excusable, when the minde is tractable, the desire good, and the heart milde, gentle, and not stubborne: for though good naturall people are ignorant of those circũstances, & know nothing, nor haue seene any thing to purpose: yet we may then perceyue them to haue good entrance and beginning of knowledge, when they do not wylfully stande in their ignorance. And for that we daily frequent and haunt such company, as are neyther sound in our Philosophie, nor good Courtiers: to finde out suche we muste note, that of all the foure vertues we haue spoken of, this is the same which makes vs perfitely to vnderstande and knowe, when any are ciuill, honest, and Courtiers to bee lyked. Some are seene verie sumptuous, and magnificall in moste of their doings, and others attempt great matters of a loftie hart, to shew a desire to reuenge their honor: and yet taste of nothing lesse than of our Philosophie. But he that is modest, tractable, and temperate, is not without the other vertues

also. And to ỹ ende that the force of this vertue may be the better perceiued, we wil proceed to speake of a good grace which chiefly amongst al ỹ rest springeth out of this vertue.

Of a good Grace.

THese foure vertues, that wee haue treated of afore, are the assured and certain causes, and very springs, from whẽce proceedeth honesty, which we likewise call Courtly ciuilitie. Of the which ciuilitie well framed, & according to the circũstances (that we haue mentioned of) applyed, is formed, borne, and nourished this good grace: which Cicero in his Offices calleth *Decorum generale*. And for that the matter to him seemeth so confused, as it is not yet framed into direct and right rules: he sayde, it might be better cõceiued in imagination, than set forth in writing: we will after him declare that little we knowe, as well by writing, as by experience. And to the end, that the difference betwene Ciuilitie and good grace, may be discerned and vnderstanded: All causes proceeding from the vertues before mentioned, are Ciuil actions, though they are not conuenient to all persones: for the vse of euerie ac-

tion

tion shoulde be digested, and moderated, according to the circumstances. This agreement and good grace commes of ciuilitie and honestie: whereby we knowe, that nothing shoulde precisely be called good grace, vnlesse it be honest: And honestie shoulde be measured, according to our vertues before shewed. Notwithstanding, oftentimes abusing the terme, we attribute it to villanous and dishonest actes; as when we say that a theft or pickerie is done with a good grace, when the fraudes, cautels, and subtilties of thæues and thæuing is well obserued. Cicero sayeth there are two kindes of good graces: one speciall, which is attributed by meane to euery one of the vertues, whe as that which we do, doth smell or taste of any particular vertue; The other generall, proceeding from all the vertues, which is a certayne framing and agreeing in all our actions, to the pleasing of the worlde, whereof we now speake. Whereby we may perceyue and iudge that they are much abused, & are not of the number of our Philosophers that will euer haue their countenance like wise men, & of great vnderstanding: and also they that will not make other shew or meane, but as magnificall and liberall: For our cheere and our countenaunce

must

must tast of Prudence, Justice, Magnanimitie, & aboue all of Temperance or Modestie. Of the which foure so assembled and united, is perfitely seene and proued to come a good grace. Where are nowe our lustie youthes, that are so lively and braue, and take so great payne to be gallant, that speake friendlye, marche delicately, and looke loftily, counterfeyting countenances in all, and supposing by this to haue a good grace: and yet are meerly ignorant of our vertues, whereof that good grace springeth. Then these pleasant apparances, that proceede from the honest actes of good Courtiers, is this good grace: which cannot be deuided nor separated from our vertue, nor our vertue from hir. And wherein is so great force to come to this perfection of honour, as nothing more: so that you may see our Gentlemen to haue more honor and reputation among Citizens and Marchants, and content them better with their borrowing persuasions, than any of these rude and rustickes can do with gifts.

Socrates the first morall Philosopher, gaue one precepte among others, whereby we might easily come to honour: which is, that we should not maske, or disguise our selues, and that we shoulde be ashamed to seeme o-

therwise

therwise in déed than we are. For (sayth he) when any shewe themselues other than they be, it is a playne argument they are of no value. And further their fayning and ypocrisie cannot but be spyed. For glorie gotten in such subtile sorte will perishe. And there is nothing so finely feyned, cunningly couched, nor craftily couered, but time will reueale the same: and all causes conueyed by dissimulation, are subiect to tyme, and are of substance like white blossomes: whereas true vertue encreaseth dayly, and groweth with time to immortall perfection.

To the ende that this appeare not contrarie to that we haue sayde of Dissimulation, which we affirm to be of so great force in our Philosophie: we muste better vnderstande the sentence of Socrates: for we followe him in this, and his opinion is verie good. True it is, that he that sheweth himselfe other than he is in déede, dissembleth: and he that dissembleth, sheweth himselfe otherwise than he is. But we must consider the ende of dissimulation, which will agree with vs easily. Socrates forbiddes such masking and general desguising, bycause we shoulde not appeare to be others than we are: and we also allowe the same. For it were very foolish and rashly

spoken,

spoken, to say that a Gentlemen Courtier hathe a minde to be sœne or accounted to shew him selfe contrarie to that he sœmeth: or to doe any thing to that ende. But Socrates letteth vs not, that hauing no desire to shew our selues contrarie to that we would be estœmed, notwithstanding we dissemble, and accommodate our selues to the imperfections of euerie one, when the same doth present vs daunger, and is pretudiciall vnto vs. For such dissembling is not euill, and in it is neyther deceyte nor fraude: but all good sayth, as it were done not of purpose to shewe our selues otherwise than we be: but to the ende to please the worlde. Himselfe doeth serue vs for example, for although he was euer like vnto himself, constant and not variable, and desirous not to be sœne other than he sœmed: yet was he the greatest dissembler in the worlde. It is therefore worthie great prayse to moderate our affections, that they appeare not any way to others: and so to dissemble and accommodate oure selues to euerie one: For this is an easie meane to wynne and drawe to vs the good willes of all men, whereof commeth honor and reputation. And although somtimes, in dissimulation is founde an euill intent, as in

those

those that vnder their fayre and fawning cheere doe couertly hyde hatred: yet for all that they doe not leaue to be good men and vertuous, so that theyr euill will appeare not too much: for it sufficeth to vs, if the meane be good, vnder the which, he that deceyueth his companion most cunningly and subtlely, is most wyse. We see the lyke in loue, which is a place where oure vertue and god grace is moste allowed and best proued, as wee haue sayde. And is not then this dissimulation requisite and necessarie to gayne by the deceyuing of one another: as Ouid maketh mention in his thirde Booke *de arte amandi.*

Sæpe viri fallunt, tenere non sæpè puellæ,
Paucaq; si queras, crimina fraudis habent.
Guile is most part graft in men,
in maydens rare to finde:
Most maydes are full of fayth,
most men haue fayth resignde.

And further,

Non tamen expositas mensa deprendat Amator,
Pyxidas, ars faciem dissimulata iuuet.
In place when thou thy mystresse spyes,
hir best to please thy countenance frame,
The easiest arte to bleare hir eyes,
well to dissemble is the same.

Some

Sometimes we must dissemble, to blind the worlde, and to shadowe our hote affections with colde regarde and countenances, or otherwise: as Helen admonished Paris, fearing least his loue should be suspected, which he made to hir in the absence of hir husband Menelaus: when she cunningly counselled him saying:

At tu dissimula, nisi tu desistere mauis:
Sed cur desistas? dissimulare licet.

Vnlesse thou minde to ceasse,
dissemble thou therefore:
But why shouldest thou now stint thy sute?
thou canst dissemble fore.

And on the contrarie, to be open and simple, is méete for beastes and ydiotes: for this presumption being still among vs, that is, euery one to deceyue other that most cunninglye can: Those that with open hart declare and shewe themselues not willing to vse fraude, are reputed ignorant, and haue not the courage to speake to a man. For this the Almaynes are best estéemed, as sometymes heretofore we the French men were: yet nowe (God be thanked) they haue prétily learned to liue: And further, when the suttelte of dissimulation, is subiect to reprehension. We should not therfore generally blame dissimu-

diſſimulation. For euill people doe make e-uill theyr profite in all things: As Ouid ſayeth *de Triſtibus*, declaring to Ceſar, that al-thoughe ſome women had euyll vſed hys Arte of loue, the booke was not therefore the worſe: For (ſayth he) euill perſons abuſe the goodneſſe of fire, whiche is notwithſtan-ding good: And ſo of all other good things.

And more:

Quodcunq; attigerit, ſi quid eſt ſtudioſa ſiniſtra
Ad vitium mores inſtruit inde ſuos.

This facilitie of the Spirite is not there-fore to be blamed which makes man acco-ding to the pleaſure of others, to chaunge and tranſforme hymſelfe. For in ſo doing he ſhall be accounted wiſe, winne honour, and be free of reprehenſion euery where: which Proteus knewe verie well, to whom his diuerſe Me-tamorphoſis and oft tranſfiguration was ve-rie commodious. Thus haue you principally the profite, whiche Temperance brings vs, for the better obteyning of this good grace.

We haue declared howe particularly we ſhoulde gouerne oure ſelues in obeying o-thers: nowe wee muſte knowe howe wee ſhall generally vſe oure actes of good grace, without regarde of the complexions, condi-tions, and priuate imperfections of anye:

As amongest Staungers, and in an vnknowne companye: or in a multitude or greate assemblye where dyuerse are of sondrie opinions, which will not be content nor thinke it good that we shoulde frame oure following more to the one than to the other, if it bee not to some noble person aboue the rest, wherein it is lawfull wythout offence to the companie, to serue and obey his pleasure. I cannot here forget the ignorance and brutishnesse of the people, who in feasts, banquettes, and assemblies, gouerne and order themselues, not according to the maner of the Court whiche is the best rule: but according to theyr particular pleasures and opinions. Wherefore it is not to be marueyled at, if oute of suche a companye manye come discontented: when euerye one of the assistaunces hauing their proper imperfections, contrarie the one to the other, it were impossyble, but in pleasing of one, wee shoulde and muste offende the other. So that if any frame themselues to obserue theyr rule and common manner: euerye one wyll constrayne hys desyre to lyke well of it. And for that the Spirite is the principall parte of manne, hauing ys cert ayne mouyngs, whiche are the affections,

fections, euen as the bodie hath. It is then the same wée shoulde moste care of. For if the mouinges be honest, and according to vertue, whiche is to saye, if the affections are not contrarye to the foure kyndes, whereof wée haue spoken afore, but are vnyted, concorded, and ruled by them, the gesture of the bodye wyll easilye followe, and nothing shall passe before the eyes of men, whiche shall not bée well done and of a good grace. For the bodye is the Organe and Instrument of the Spirite, by the whiche it doeth shewe it selfe, and makes knowne what it is. It was not wythoute cause, that certayne Philosophers sayde howe that the Spirite is euer lyke it selfe, and neuer commes wyth more cunning, nor better learned from the Schooles than shée was béefore: For those that are Tutours and Teachers, do not instruct the Spirites of Infants: But only open, and stretch out the cunduytes of the bodie, to the ende, that the Spirite being deliuered, may know and shewe hir selfe, whereby wé see that menne of weake and feeble Spirites, cannot become learned: What payne and studye soeuer they take, what tyme and charge so euer they spende, and what

maister or learner, so euer they haue. The reason is, that the Vesselles and powers of the bodye beeing once opened, nothing more can bee done: and no cunnyng industrie or labour, can any way alter or chaunge the condition of the Spirite. Wherein it seemeth to mee needelesse, in a matter and case so cleare, to vse anye Argument, for to shewe whether the qualitye of the Spirite of manne, bee vertuous or no, when it is to bee knowne by the gesture and outwarde countenaunce of the bodye: as it were impossible for the bodye, to serue for a maske or false Visarde to the Spright, which is euen so. For where as sundry singular good Authours, haue desyred to make vs vnderstande the conditions and properties of persones paste, eyther howe they were learned, wyse, magnificall, or suche lyke, and woulde perfitely represent them and describe them vnto vs: they coulde not otherwyse make them better knowne than by theyr actes, gestures, and maner of lyuing: As wee may see in Salust, who doeth so lyuely counterfeyte Cateline: and in the Poetes, who had greate delyghte in suche descriptions. And wee oure selues, when wee see a manne styll busie wythoute purpose

purpose or reason, wee saye hée is wauering and inconstant: and when we heare one speake muche and lyke or allowe of hys talke, wée saye hée is wyse, and of a good iudgement. And so wee commonly iudge others by theyr outwarde signes. For to speake a truth, howe shoulde we otherwise haue the knowledge of things inuisible, secrete and hidden: if not by the exteriour apparaunces that be presented to some one of oure senses? Then wée must nédes conclude, that the countenaunce of manne reuealeth and bewrayeth the knowledge of his Spirite: the whiche can bée no other in outwarde shewe, than shée doeth forme them. Wherefore we ought not to blame the maner of liuyng of a learned man, wyse, bountyfull or liberall: thoughe hée haue not doctrine, prudence, liberalitie, and other qualities of the Spirite. And for that there are many whiche haue not the true knowledge of hir propertyes, (which is no other but vertue or vyce) and consequently vnderstande not that it is parte of oure Philosophie: this is the cause, that knowyng nothing of the manners, gesture, and liuing of men, wee commonlye iudge of them otherwise than they are. As of a yong sotte or fole

braynlesse and full of prattling, they will esteeme, wise, pleasaunt, and a good speaker: and on the contrarie, of one prudent, modest, and a ciuill Courtier, they wyll regarde as proude, glorious, and of no vnderstanding. These kinde of noddies be of the number of the ignorant multitude, whiche are nothing certaine, but so blinded, that they followe in iudgement of all thinges their first opinion whatsoeuer it be. Of whom it is sayd, *Quot capita, tot sensus.* As many heads so many wittes. Agaynst whom whosoeuer will contende, is like Hercules fighting with the Serpent Hidra, hauing many heades, who as soone as he had cut of one, there presently sprang out in his place fiue or six more, as euill or worse than the first. The minde of man hath two gouernours reason and appetite: Reason is the same whereby he willes nothing contrarie to vertue: and appetite is that which makes vs desire all things, without regarde or choyse of good or euill, and sekes no other thing, but onelye for pleasure. Therefore we shoulde in all our life, haue great regarde that wee take nothing in hande wythoute some honest intent. It is a maxime or principle, that the Sages in tymes past left for vs to followe: *Nihil frustra*, Nothing in vaine.

If

If in all our doings before the execution, wee holde thys consideration, to thinke of, wherfore wee doe it, and to what ende: surelye there shall not bee so many repentaunces, as there is. And for this cause is it remembred that the wise man neuer sayeth, I thought it not, or it repents me: not for that he ought or should not repent him, when he hath done euil: but for that he attẽpeth nothing, without consideration wherfore and to what end: after ỹ which cõsideration, repentance cõmes neuer or seldome. Therefore we must haue great foresight that in all our aas & deeds, we execute nothing rashly, and without aduice: which if we do, reason shal rule & gouerne so well, ỹ the spirit wil not deliuer frõ hir, any thing but vertue: frõ whence this good grace shal then be sene to proceede. Euen so the appetite yelding to discretion, wil enterprise nothing in vs, but be obedient in executing the decree and commission of reason. Then these immoderate affections, whiche are so blinded & insolent, that they make vs subiect & slaues to our owne proper opinions: shall be banished from vs, as an euill contrarie to our Philosophie: whiche is not but to please and be gracious to others, whereby is obteyned honour and reputation. A man

thus ruled and gouerned shal haue his whole senses free, to studie the best meane howe he ought to liue: and when we shall once vnderstande and knowe our vertue to be suche as we haue shewed afore, he will addresse all his thoughtes towarde hir, and will doe nothing which shall not be agreeable to euerie man, wherby he may receiue prayse and estimation of the worlde: which is the accomplishment of our desired enterprise.

Se here the happie way we must holde: and wherupon is grounded the perfite glorie of our Philosophie. Se howe the true and right Courtiers liue: which bende and bowe their owne proper affections to followe oure vertue, and be pleasing to all men. Beholde the true fountayne from whence springs the good grace, which consisteth principally (as we see) in modestie and temperance. Where are nowe these glorious vaunters, that tryumph in theyr imperfections and good heads? which will not (as they say) for any man liuing, doe otherwyse than after theyr owne braynes? We must sende them to *Tymon Misantrope* that enimie of mankinde, and exclude them cleane from our companie.

The Gentleman Courtyer is none of those, nor so addicted to his owne desires, or so subiect

ſubiect to himſelfe, but plyant like ware, redie to receyue any honeſt or frendly impreſſion. For if it be nædefull to laughe, hæ reioyceth: If to be ſad, he lowreth: If to be angry, he frowneth: If to fæde, he eateth: If to faſte, he pyneth. And to conclude, he is ready to doe whatſoeuer it be, accoʒding to the humoʒs and complexions of his felowſhip and Courtly companie, althoughe his affections are cleane contrary. Yet in all theſe actions, he muſte vſe a pʒudence, that he do not any thing lyghtly, but ſo grauely and with ſuche a modeſt meane, as if he had double conſideration in it, regarding why, howe, where & when, with all other circumſtãces. And that he haue euer in his mouth not to doe wʒong to anye, but to garde and defende the righte of all men. And if it bæ nædefull to bæ magnificall, ſo to vſe it, as it ſæme to be done not nigardlye, but bountifullye: that he haue his hart firme, faſte, and aſſured, not moued oʒ baſhfull at any ſudden motion, how ſtraũge oʒ ſtatelie ſoeuer it be. That he ſo moderate and bʒidle his pʒiuate affections, as nothing be ſæne to come from him, but curteſie, gentleneſſe, and humanitie. And doing this, ther wil pʒeſently appeare in him ſo good a grace, that he ſhall eaſily dʒaw vnto him the fauoʒ

and benevolence of everye man. And as all the worlde may perfectly perceyue, that by the exterior and outwarde actes, one cannot so well deceyue, or so easily beguyle the simplest of iudgemente that is, if hee haue not these instructions in his mynde, without the whiche none can attayne to this perfection of knowledge. Therefore lette vs followe and rule oure selues by others, accustoming to doe as they doe, and make a good foundation. For the firste praise consisteth in inuenting and executing in himselfe somewhat that is good: the seconde to prowue it good, and to followe the same that others haue done good by. And in so directing oure dowyngs, besydes that manye will accompte of vs as greate Philosophers, and beeing knowen of the best in our vertue not to haue the whole vnderstanding of it: yet at the leaste they will commende & prayse our desire to knowe the ground of it: whiche by little & little wyll so polish and burnishe our countenance, that in the ende wee may well come to the perfection of this good grace. Lette vs marke the Italian his Ciuilitie and courtesie. For auncient Rome the mother and nourse of manye of oure Philosophie (although they haue wrytten of others,

thers) haue sowen and spredde in all the countrey certayne countenances and gestures, whiche are daylye practised in suche sorte, as, though some haue not their mindes perfectly instructed, yet they haue their chers and gestures so framed, by a custome of following it, that they seeme to vs the beste for Courtly grace in the worlde. The Italian will not appeare in any his actes rashe or heady, but so coldely and so soberly semes to consider all circumstances, as thoughe hee tasted the sappe and substance of oure beste vertue, whiche procedes of Prudence. And in doing wrong to any, whereby the lawe may touche him, or the Judge byte him (as wee haue sayde speaking of Justice) he is so circumspecte, as hee commonlye keepes and conueyes himselfe out of bondage euer. And if it bee needefull to playe *Signor Magnifico*, God knowes how he wyll do his endeuour. Touching ỹ hawtinesse of hart & noblenesse of minde, there are none in ỹ world do better or with more maiestie represent it thã they. They blushor bash at nothing: for if you suppose sodainly to moue them, with a shrinke of their shoulder they shake it of, & make a good apparãce. If you suppose to make them laughe, they will not chaunge countenance:

And

And for the reste, it is nedeleste to tell, howe they couer, hyde, and represse their affections with their greate pacience and dissimulation. So that to conclude, they are borne and bredde in their countrey Courtiers. By this example, such as cannot well instruct their mindes in our Philosophie, shall doe singularly well to endeuour and accustome themselues, to imitate, followe, and represent the best liked and moste allowed in the same. I was of opinion to proceede in this matter more particularly, but I fele my pen blũt & weary: & I am willing to recreate my selfe in this countrey where I am newly come.

The Conclusion.

I Will content my selfe to haue opened thus much, by the which such as haue good eyesight, may as in a turrette or prospectiue place, regarde a farre off, and see many things touching the varietie of mans lyfe, whereof we haue no whit spoken. We may also perceyue that this Philosophy morall, that commaundes vs to do all things which is good faythfully and truely, howe it hath made vs to gather togither this, wher-

of we

of we haue treated: which willes vs to doe the same, that séemes good to men. And this error is not to be wondered at, since it coms of the corruption and depravation of oure mindes, who accompts that good which is euill according to the iudgemēt of other men somewhat perfect. For wée haue so manye spyes and enimies, that séeke no other than to entrappe and meshe vs in these follies & vanities, to the ende we should not know the true way we ought to take: that it is impossible for this second nature (wherin the Sages and worldly wise haue sette their onely good and felicitie) to resist or withstād them: wherby most part of men are deceyued, supposing to haue this Philosophie, whiche they haue not. And others that are sayde to bée more wise, are most abused: beléeuing that in the same whiche they haue, consisteth the onely good & happy state of man, whereas in déede there is nothing more contrarye to the soueraine bountie than their Science alone: whiche doth no other, but puffe and lyfte vp these our mindes against the alone and only omnipotent puyssance. Wherfore I affirme that true Philosophie is the despising & contemning of Philosophie and his foundation, whiche is this second nature, that God hath

not

not made. For by the faulte of man it is become so corrupted. If wée wyll bée Philosophers, we muste shake from vs and vnfolde the darkenesse and impedimentes of this seconde nature, & hir consequence: (what this consequence is, I leaue to others iudgemēt) and indeuour our selues to reknowledge the first, which is the same that God made: who will gyue vs his blessing and grace so to doe, if wés open the gate vnto him who séeketh vs, saying, I stand at your doze and knocke therat, if any will receyue me, I wyll come in and eate with him, and he with me.

FINIS.

To the Reader.

Ontente thy selfe for the presente (gentle Reader) with that I haue opened vnto thee the gate of my thoughtes, and brought thee into the Cabinet of my contemplations: hoping (if thou take it pleasauntly) that I wyll shewe thee peece after peece, the remnant of the little Treasure that I haue there.

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